Angus Taylor's home-made power crisis

The federal government’s energy security policies fly in the face of a private sector solution to post-coal power. 

Australia’s coal-fired power stations are struggling yet we have no national plan to achieve the transition to renewables. Threatening electricity-generating businesses with a new, big stick might serve a naked political purpose but it is not a plan for cheaper, reliable electricity.

A stable policy framework is essential for investor confidence, but the federal government seems intent on bludgeoning Australia’s public companies into doing what it wants.

If private investors were left to their own devices, they would solve the problem, but the risk of taxpayer-subsidised rival projects emerging at any time is elevating commercial risk to prohibitive levels.

Consider a few examples. The federal government has an Underwriting New Generation Investment (UNGI) program. In December 2019 it announced it had agreed initial terms with two projects and shortlisted another 10, but more than a year later no firm agreements have been negotiated.

Instead, the main development with UNGI has been its inclusion by the Australian National Audit Office in its 2020-21 annual audit work program – presumably because the program’s integrity and transparency are under a cloud.

The Audit Office has already ruled adversely on the government’s funding of an incomplete  feasibility study for a new coal-fired power station at Gladstone https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/power-station-feasibility-grant-broke-funding-rules-auditor-general-20210318-p57c24

Taxpayer-underwritten electricity generating projects could pop out of UNGI at any time without anyone outside the government knowing how they were selected.

Private investors can’t be expected to invest in new generating capacity when they face the risk of a subsidised competitor emerging from a ministerial office.

In the Hunter Valley, the ageing Liddell power station has been slated for closure in the next couple of years, leaving a gaping hole from around April 2023 in the state’s firming capacity at times of intermediate and peak demand when renewables aren’t available.

As a component of its gas-led recovery, the federal government has threatened to use its own corporation – Snowy Hydro Limited – to build a 1,000 megawatt gas-fired generator at Kurri if the private sector does not reach a final investment decision by the end of next month.

The government has foreshadowed a taxpayer-funded subsidy would be provided either through the underwriting of the gas-fired project or a special purpose vehicle with a taxpayer contribution.

Liberal governments are supposed to embrace free-market ideology but this one seems fonder of socialist interventions in the private sector.

Energy minister Angus Taylor is pressuring Squadron Energy and EnergyAustralia to make commitments by end-April to build their respective gas fired power plants at Port Kembla and in the Shoalhaven region https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/taylor-ups-pressure-on-generators-to-commit-to-new-plants-20210319-p57c69

Squadron Energy’s fast-start gas-fired plant is one of the shortlisted projects for UNGI. It is reportedly set to meet minister Taylor’s deadline – as long as UNGI underwriting is confirmed https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/forrest-commits-to-fast-track-for-nsw-green-power-20210321-p57cok

Commitments from the several proposed large batteries in NSW are also needed by April to ensure they count towards the government’s target for 1,000 megawatts of capacity.

It’s a race against time; if 1,000 megawatts of private-sector capacity isn’t committed by end-April for operation in time for the Liddell closure, the government will step in with Snowy Hydro.

Several large grid-scale batteries are under contemplation for the Hunter region. These include AGL’s grid-scale battery of up to 500 megawatts on the Liddell site, Origin Energy’s proposed 700 megawatt battery at its coal-fired power station at Eraring and CEP Energy’s planned 1,200 megawatt battery at Kurri. In addition, Neoen plans to build a 500 megawatt battery at the site of the former Wallerawang power plant.

These announcements of plans for massive grid-scale batteries tell us that the private sector is more than capable of providing the firming capacity needed when the Liddell power station closes.

But with ongoing threats of government intervention that could at any time undermine the business case for investment, private sector reticence continues and April 2023 moves ever nearer.

Meanwhile, EnergyAustralia has announced it is bringing forward by four years the closure of the Yallourn power station in the Latrobe Valley. Again, the government has threatened the industry, minister Taylor telling Sky News: “We’re not going to stand by idly and watch a loss of reliability and affordability” https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/energyaustralia-to-close-yallourn-early-20210310-p579by

During the day, when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing, renewables, with their zero fuel costs, are smashing coal-fired generators in the market. Coal-fired generators cannot turn on and off at short notice. Therefore, they must burn coal whether they are making money or not.

Lots more renewable energy is heading into the grid, so the situation for coal generators will only get worse.

If one of the units on ageing coal-fired power stations were to break down, requiring replacement, the operators of these power stations are likely to struggle to justify to their boards the $100+ million to replace a unit. Yet the government seems to expect companies to impose losses on their shareholders at its instruction.

A realistic scenario is one where older coal-fired power stations limp along and then fail.

The chair of the Energy Security Board, Kerry Schott, has warned that it would not be surprising to see the early closure of more coal-fired power stations and that by the mid-2030s only Mt Piper is likely to be operating in NSW https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/coal-power-stations-going-broke-schott-20210216-p572xn

Dr Schott is working on rule changes to address these realities.

A government threatening private investors if they don’t do what it says – and promptly – will only make a difficult situation impossible.

The market has worked out that renewables, supported by gas peaking plant, grid-scale batteries and pumped hydro, will fill the hole being left as Australia’s coal-fired power stations retire earlier than previously anticipated.

The biggest threat to Australia’s energy security and competitiveness is not the private sector but the federal government.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics. He is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

 

 

 

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/angus-t...

This is no time to stall on reform

The Porter affair is draining political energy from post-virus change. Have an inquiry and deal with it.

An economic rebound is an excellent time to implement reforms to lock in the recovery and place an economy on a sustainable growth trajectory. Now is such a time. But an indignant government is missing the reform boat.

Last week’s national accounts confirm an economic rebound from Australia’s first recession in almost three decades. Yet two strong quarters of growth have not been enough to restore the economy to its pre-pandemic size.

A smaller economic pie is being divided among more Australians as they have continued to produce babies while fewer have left our shores for life abroad.

Consequently, despite the rebound, GDP per person was down 3.5 per cent in 2020 compared with 2019 and national income per person was also lower.

What could go wrong from here? Plenty.  

The scheduled termination of JobKeeper from end-March and the recent sharp reduction in the JobSeeker payment will greatly reduce fiscal support for the recovery.

While the threat of a W-shaped recovery https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/time-to-worry-about-a-w-shaped-economic-slump-20200518-p54tv0 from a premature withdrawal of fiscal support has receded upon its extension from end-September 2020 to end-March 2021, the government should be cautious about cutting back too hard too soon.

The cut in JobSeeker is harsh. The payment effectively has two components: a living allowance and a job-search allowance. At the present elevated levels of unemployment, job-search costs are greater than they were when the unemployment rate was below 5 per cent. The new rate of JobSeeker therefore is actually more austere than the rate of the old Newstart.

The possible emergence of new, resistant strains of COVID-19 is also a threat to the health and economic recovery of the nation.

So, too, are ongoing restrictions on the arrival of foreign students at our universities – Australia’s fourth-largest export earner.

Even if luck falls our way, as it has with resurgent iron ore prices, it cannot last. A new economic reform agenda is essential.

Professor Ross Garnaut’s new book, Reset, provides such an agenda https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/good-bye-to-all-that-complacency-20210221-p574gg

High on Garnaut’s list is Australia’s emergence as a renewable energy superpower, exploiting the continent’s abundance of solar and wind power.

The Morrison government could be working with the eastern states to establish renewable energy zones coupled with grid-scale batteries and pumped hydro but is struggling with the hard right within its own ranks that wants to re-crown coal as king.

Trade unions and business groups worked with industrial relations minister, Christian Porter, on a package of workplace reforms, but he inexplicably included in the legislation provisions for the suspension of the Better Off Overall Test for COVID-affected businesses.

Those provisions are being removed but, now on mental health leave, Porter won’t be around to argue his case for the bill with the Senate.

Porter and his cabinet colleagues are hoping the controversy over the rape allegation against him will blow over. Media reporting from every government announcement will be dominated by unanswered questions about the alleged rape.

A closed-door inquiry by a retired female judge taking sworn statements would enable the government to get on with a reform program. It would not constitute “mob rule” as the government claims, any more than did the judicial inquiry into the failure of Hawke government minister, Mick Young, to declare a Paddington bear for customs duty.  After standing aside, based on the inquiry’s findings, Young was reinstated to cabinet.

Allegations of sexual misbehaviour by footballers are handled behind closed doors by the sport’s integrity commissions. The footballer is not required to prove his innocence, any more than Porter would be required to prove his – despite his specious claim to the contrary.

As a departmental secretary in Queensland I was subjected to an eight-month inquiry by the Crime and Misconduct Commission. Whenever the inquiry looked like ending, more spurious allegations were made against me in the media, kicking it along. I was fully exonerated.

My reputation could not have been restored without the process of an independent inquiry.

The circumstances surrounding the alleged rape are horrible. Porter’s accuser took her own life. Porter is traumatised by the allegations against him when he was a 17-year-old.

In the absence of a coronial inquest in South Australia, Porter would be wise to call for a closed-door, independent inquiry and stand aside for its duration. Some of Porter’s critics would never be satisfied but everyday Australians would conclude that the matter had been taken as far as was reasonably possible.

Otherwise, the government would be open to the criticism that it disbelieved a female suicide victim in favour of one of its own men. If the government believes the matter will blow over and the women of the parliamentary press gallery and of Australia will move on, it is badly mistaken.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, Director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/this-...

Good-bye to all that complacency

A better post-virus Australia means junking our mistakes in immigration, monetary and climate policy.

From today, a detailed roadmap is available for transforming Australia to a country of growing and shared prosperity, social cohesion and leadership in global efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Professor Ross Garnaut’s latest book, Reset, is, as expected, economically coherent. But its policy prescriptions are also mostly realistic, politically feasible and available to any mainstream political party with ambition for our nation.

Garnaut’s analysis shatters the complacency associated with the Morrison government’s early goal of snapback. He argues persuasively that snapping back to the pre-pandemic policy settings that yielded weak productivity and wages growth, unnecessarily high unemployment and underemployment and falling private investment would condemn everyday Australians to stagnant or declining incomes.

Garnaut warns that stagnation and a decline in living standards would drive deepening disillusionment with our economic and political systems.

Of all the policy errors Garnaut identifies, he concentrates his energies on three: immigration policy, monetary policy and climate policy.

Reset is not a politically loaded book. Garnaut describes, for instance, the Morrison government’s immediate response to the pandemic recession as “an economic policy success story.” And he supports the government’s investment allowance as a modest but useful step towards the cash flow tax he and his colleagues have been advocating https://www.afr.com/politics/tax-cash-flow-instead-of-profit-say-economists-20181209-h18wjs

On immigration policy, Garnaut laments an unannounced but fundamental shift: a change in the composition of the immigration intake away from permanent, skilled migration to temporary, low-skilled migration. The effect, he points out, has been to integrate the Australian labour market into the global market for the first time, suppressing both jobs and wages for many Australians.

Yet the Reserve Bank has been worried about low wages growth for several years now, concerned about its consequences for consumer spending which constitutes more than half of Australia’s GDP.

But it is on the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy settings that Garnaut delivers his most withering critique. He points out that not once in seven years did the Reserve Bank achieve its targets for unemployment or inflation, yet doggedly stuck to its inappropriate settings.

By running a tighter monetary policy since 2012 than the central banks of the world’s largest economies, the Reserve Bank has been responsible for what Garnaut describes as the “voluntary unemployment” of several hundred thousand Australians – unemployment he says the Reserve Bank “chooses to allow.”

By deliberately keeping Australian interest rates above international levels before belatedly lowering them to virtually zero, and by refusing to engage in quantitative easing before being dragged by reality into doing so, the Reserve Bank has been fighting a war on inflation that was won last century. The Reserve Bank’s determination to refight an old war pushed the Australian dollar much higher than it needed to be, badly damaging Australian competitiveness, job creation and private investment.

Garnaut’s analysis and monetary policy prescriptions place him in the same camp as Paul Keating https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/keating-lashes-rba-high-priests-over-slow-recession-response-20200923-p55yhy Percy Allan and me https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/how-to-avoid-a-september-cliff-edge-20200629-p5573z but against the weight of established opinion.

Quantitative easing has its own consequences, fuelling asset prices, including house prices, exacerbating inequality and causing resentment among younger generations. But, as Garnaut points out, the financial authorities have other tools to deal with this, including macroprudential policies to rein in bank lending.

Within this approach, the Reserve Bank could buy bonds not from private banks that have bought them from the Treasury, but directly from the Treasury https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/how-to-avoid-a-september-cliff-edge-20200629-p5573z. While maintaining its independence from government, the Reserve Bank would cut out the banking middlemen and directly fund the public sector’s debt requirements.

Garnaut’s roadmap to a sustained recovery with social cohesion involves:

§  cutting back heavily on temporary migration;

§  running a monetary policy that aligns with those of the central banks of major economies until our economy yields rising real wages;

§  maintaining at some level the support being provided by JobSeeker and alternatives to JobKeeper until we are close to full employment;

§  replacing company income tax with a cash flow tax; and

§  seizing the opportunity for Australia to become a clean energy superpower afforded by its abundance of renewable energy sources and vast tracts of land into which carbon can be absorbed.

Also on Garnaut’s roadmap is the provision of a universal basic income of $15,000 per annum designed to restore a sense of equity in the Australian community. He points out that it would be expensive, but at a time when we need to lift consumer spending anyway, while clawing back much of the cost as the workforce participation rate increases through the 2020s.

My own view is that a universal basic income, as worthy as it is, might be too expensive for either major party to contemplate at this time of burgeoning public debt – but that it bolsters the case for JobSeeker to be maintained at a level well above that of Newstart before the pandemic struck.

More fundamentally, Garnaut calls for a return to valuing knowledge and our universities as the only viable basis for sound policy making and a revival of respect for our democratic institutions. Biden’s victory over the cults and conspiracies cultivated by Trump and his cronies gives Americans renewed hope.

We Australians can hope too. Garnaut’s policy roadmap gives us hope that Australia can emerge from its great complacency, put its dog days behind it and enter a new era of economic and social progress in a fairer society.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics, a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of RMIT’s APEC Study Centre and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

 

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/good-by...

Run down by the green tariff train

Industry has realised that Australia is a sitting duck for the EU’s climate plans. The Morrison government has not.

Australian government ministers stating they are opposed to the European Union applying levies against carbon-intensive imports is about as effective as announcing they oppose the coronavirus in the hope it will go away.

Asked last week whether he opposed carbon tariffs, Energy Minister Angus Taylor declared he was “dead against” them. That should fix it: now that the Europeans know we’re against carbon tariffs they’ll no doubt apologise for offending us and abandon the idea.

Or they will press ahead, undaunted, as they did with the Common Agricultural Policy in the 1980s that so badly damaged our non-subsidised farmers.

In fact, a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has already been approved by the relevant committee of the European Parliament, with passage through the full Parliament expected early next month. A detailed proposal will then be presented in the second quarter of 2021 for adoption in June and a commencement date of 2023.

The CBAM’s unveiling will be around the same time that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will host a G7 summit to which Prime Minister Morrison has been invited. Johnson is advocating stronger action on climate change in Britain and globally.

Turning up the heat on other countries in the hope of turning it down for the planet, President Joe Biden is convening a climate summit on 22 April, to which Scott Morrison is also expected to be invited.

Having re-joined the Paris Agreement, Biden will lift America’s emission-reduction ambition and will expect other countries to do the same.

Ahead of the November 2020 presidential election, Biden and his running mate, Kamala Harris, committed the United States to a CBAM by a different name. Biden’s new Treasury Secretary, former Federal Reserve Chair, Janet Yellen, has previously advocated the formation of a customs union of high-ambition countries that would impose carbon levies on low-ambition countries https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/morrison-left-exposed-to-climate-damage-by-biden-win-20201109-p56cpv

Australian ministers have argued that a CBAM would violate the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). A clumsily designed CBAM could do that, but the media statement released by the EU’s committee on 5 February explicitly states that the CBAM should be misused as a tool for protectionism.

A CBAM can be WTO compliant if it is just sufficient to prevent carbon leakage, which occurs where a good produced domestically using a low-emission technology is displaced by an imported good using high-emission technology whose emissions are not properly priced.

Since the form of a CBAM chosen by the committee among four options canvassed in last year’s consultation paper is one linked to the EU’s own emissions trading system, it can be WTO compliant.

Full compliance depends on its other design features. The CBAM would need, for example, to be based on the actual carbon content of particular imports, not on whether the exporting country had high or low ambition for emission reductions. It would not be enough for an exporter to the EU to claim exemption simply because the exporter’s government issued a media statement committing the country to high ambition.

A clear indication of Australia’s vulnerability can be gleaned from the resolution passed by the European Parliament’s committee, which “strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the Union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations, as recently observed at COP25.”

It was Australia that reserved the right at that COP25 meeting in December 2019 to count carryover credits from the Kyoto Protocol to meet its Paris emission-reduction commitments https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/australia-cheating-on-paris-says-former-un-climate-chief-20200308-p547yf

While it seems the Morrison government has since abandoned the contrivance of using the Kyoto carryover credits, the EU remains on a collision course with Australia.

If we had our own effective emissions trading scheme we would be exempted.

But the Abbott government scrapped that, exposing Australian industry to punishing tariffs not only in the EU but in all countries being mooted as members of a possible climate customs union. They include Britain, the US, Japan, Korea and possibly even China, which has committed to zero net emissions by 2060. What’s the betting China will bring forward that date to 2050 ahead of the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in November? 

The EU’s CBAM is a speeding locomotive and Australia is a sitting duck. The locomotive is scheduled to arrive in June 2021 and no amount of quacking will stop it.

Yet Deputy Prime Minister Michael McCormack seems unperturbed, saying he’s not worried about what might happen in 30 years’ time, while former ministers Matt Canavan and Barnaby Joyce are insisting that agriculture be carved out from any zero net-emissions target https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/nationals-cite-nz-model-for-emissions-plan-20210207-p5708a

Never mind that peak agricultural groups including the National Farmers’ Federation and Meat and Livestock Australia support the target, having worked out that their members can make good money from it by generating and selling carbon credits from soil sequestration not only in Australia but abroad, including in the EU.

This is just another example of Australian businesses taking the lead in responding to the imperatives of climate change. In doing their business cases, they are factoring in a global carbon price, while banks and insurance companies will continue to shift away from financing carbon-intensive industries.

Quacking about protectionism will not stop the CBAM locomotive heading towards Australia. If the federal government ignores it there will be blood on the tracks.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics, a consulting economist to KPMG, a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the APEC study Centre at RMIT and an adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

 

 

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-clim...

Morrison riding on feel-good factor

The Prime Minister may try to win a tight election this year while there is still some afterglow from a pale recovery.

When you were a child, do you remember getting ill and then recovering? During the recovery you can feel better than before you got struck down. And so it is with economic recoveries. People, relieved that the worst is over, can feel better than before a recession first hit. That’s what the Morrison government will be banking on in deciding when to call an election.

Ahead of the first week of parliament this year, it’s timely to assess the economy’s trajectory and how it will shape the timing and possible outcome of the next federal election.

Having recorded its first recession in almost three decades, the economy has bounced back – but not to where it was before the recession. A full recovery will take some time, possibly a great deal of time.

The termination of JobKeeper at the end of March and the foreshadowed reversion of JobSeeker to not much higher than its pre-pandemic rate as Newstart will act as a drag on recovery. So too will the unavailability of foreign students for our universities as international travel bans remain in place for at least the next year or two.

Thereafter, the economy is likely to get worse not better. Why? The answer is a lack of population growth arising from low levels of immigration and ongoing poor productivity growth.

Between 2012 and when the pandemic struck, the economy grew at an average of only 2.4 per cent per annum. Of this, 1.8 percentage points – or two-thirds – was due to population growth. Most of that population growth was from immigration of younger people, which is likely to be negligible for the next couple of years.

In the absence of strong population growth, the living standards of Australians could nevertheless rise if we achieved strong productivity growth. But the portents are bad.

Productivity growth requires large amounts of private investment embodying the latest technologies. Yet non-mining business investment actually fell by almost 5 per cent in 2019-20 and the government’s economic and fiscal update released late last year forecasts a further fall of 11 per cent in 2020-21 before recovering a bit in 2021-22 to still be a full 14 per cent below its pre-recession level.

When the economy began recovering after the recession of the early 1990s but soon began to slow again, Liberal leader John Howard described it, based on focus group research, as “five minutes of economic sunshine” – to telling political effect.

The Morrison government faces the possibility that it will deliver “five minutes of economic sunshine” with the economy growing weakly, if not sliding back into recession, after a short-lived recovery. In these circumstances, unemployment would remain well above its pre-pandemic levels and real wages would not be growing, continuing the trend since 2013.

In these economic circumstances, Labor would take a leaf out of British Labour’s history book, campaigning on the basis that while Winston Churchill had won the war, the Attlee-led Labour Party would win the peace by guiding the economy to reconstruction and recovery. Labour won the 1945 general election in a landslide.

The earliest practical date for a general election is October this year, after several redistributions are completed. That might still be in the afterglow of a partial economic recovery.

Yet during the pandemic, when state and territory incumbent parties have enjoyed massive polling leads over their rivals and several resounding election victories, the Coalition government in Canberra has led the Labor opposition by only 52-48 per cent or 51-49 per cent.

Some commentators have declared the next election run and won by the Coalition. Many were equally confident that Labor was over the line in the 2019 election months before it was held.

In the modern era, some election outcomes were predictable, including Whitlam in 1972, Hawke in 1983, Rudd in 2007 and Abbott in 2013. Most others were slugfests, seat-by-seat contests. 

The Albanese-led Labor Party is doing what the election review recommended: avoiding numerous, expensive spending commitments in favour of a few signature policies. The childcare policy and rewiring the nation to connect renewables to the grid announced by Albanese in his budget reply were two such signature polices.

Whenever the next election is held, it is shaping to be a close contest affected heavily by voter perceptions about whether they are feeling good about the recovery through good, secure jobs and solid wage growth or that the economic sunshine was pale and short lived.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT and an adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/morri...

Replacing Corporate Income Tax with a Cash Flow Tax

Replacing Corporate Income Tax with a Cash Flow Tax 

Ross Garnaut, Craig Emerson, Reuben Finighan and Stephen Anthony*

Abstract

We design a parsimonious cash flow tax for Australia and estimate revenue effects. It allows immediate deduction of all capital expenditures, denies deductions of interest payments, and compensates negative cash flows at the same rate and time as it taxes positive cash flows. It allows taxpayer timing choice on implementation over 10 years. It has incentive effects comparable to lowering the corporate income tax rate to zero. It removes distortions that artificially favour debt over equity, short‐ over long‐term investments, rents over competitive returns, large, established over small and new businesses, and conventional over innovative investments. It closes international tax evasion loopholes. Its spur to investment and timing of revenue impacts favours implementation in recession.

1.    Governments have been Cutting Corporate Income Tax Rates

This paper sets out an alternative approach to corporate income taxation that aims to reduce or remove the main weaknesses of the established approach. The authors see it as a change that would generate large benefits for long‐term economic growth, and involves relatively small disruption to established administration of the corporate tax laws. It happens to be useful to the current macro‐economic circumstances. A corporate taxation model for the twenty‐ first century has to take account of a number of realities: greater mobility of capital, giving rise to an international ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation rates to attract and retain investment; increasing international payments for management and intellectual property fees in deductions from assessable income; increasing opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion through transactions across international borders; an expansion in the proportion of rent and decline of competitive returns on capital in corporate income; a decline in the competitive position of national against multinational corporations arising out of the former's more limited opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion; a declining national tax compliance culture; and growing resentment of ‘globalisation’ arising out of multinational enterprises’ tax avoidance and evasion.

Public concerns about these matters have contributed to the reaction against ‘globalisation’ and to growing mistrust of market exchange.

Over the last decade or so governments have been cutting their rates of corporate income tax, ostensibly to attract foreign investment to their jurisdictions or to hold onto foreign investment when competitor countries cut their tax rates. The economic justification given is that capital is mobile internationally and will gravitate to countries with low corporate income tax rates. In this competitive race to reduce corporate income tax rates, less emphasis is placed on the base of the corporate income tax, despite its capacity to exert at least as much influence on after‐tax returns on competitive investment as the tax rate.

The empirical evidence on the effect of corporate income tax rates on investment decisions is not compelling. The case is often argued from a model that assumes unrealistically that there is perfect competition in all relevant markets. Even in competitive situations, other considerations are highly influential on investment decisions, including the tax base, sovereign risk, the independence and transparency of regulatory and legal systems, foreign exchange restrictions, workforce skills, and geographic location. Nevertheless, governments remain under pressure to reduce their corporate income tax rates. This is problematic for financial stability, for the continued supply of public goods that are essential for the efficient operation of the economy, and for equitable income distribution.

The rigorous application of economic principles has led us to search for systems of taxation that have low incidence on returns on capital operating in a competitive market, and high incidence on economic rent.

This paper suggests a major change in approach to taxing corporate income. It proposes changing the corporate tax base, from a conventional view of income to cash flow. This increases the incidence of the tax on economic rent, and reduces the incidence on competitive or ‘normal’ returns on investment. It improves the trade‐off between the amount of revenue collected and the amount of welfare‐enhancing investment.

Our proposed cash flow tax is relatively simple to administer, applying familiar and well‐tested measurements of the taxation base. It has a strongly positive effect on incentives for investment of mobile capital compared to existing corporate income taxation schemes. When applied in a single country, its effect on investment incentives is comparable to that of a corporate income taxation rate of zero—so removing the international ‘race to the bottom’. It removes an important distortion in traditional approaches to taxation: the artificial promotion of debt over equity, which has adverse consequences for financial efficiency and national economic stability. By abolishing the distinction between recurrent and capital expenditure, it removes a disincentive to long‐lived and capital‐intensive investment that is a feature of the current tax system. It removes and reverses a bias in the current taxation system that favours low‐risk investment and does not support innovation. It removes major contemporary avenues for large‐scale avoidance and evasion of corporate taxation. It avoids one important source of inequality in the distribution of income in developed countries. Introduced in a deep recession—as it would be in Australia in 2020–21—its revenue impact would be expansionary, with the reduction of revenue withdrawn automatically over time.

Like any change in taxation arrangements, moving to the proposed system would impose some deadweight costs. By allowing taxpayers a choice over a decade of the year of transition from the old to the new system, we would minimise disruption. Second, the proposed denial of deductions for royalties on foreign intellectual property—an important feature of our proposal that could be introduced into the conventional corporate tax regime as well—might be seen as reducing incentives for global innovation. We judge that this effect will be negligible and more than offset by increased incentives for innovation in Australia.

2.      Rent Taxes and the Ideal of Neutrality in Taxation 

If the objective is to maximise national income, taxes should not affect investment decisions; that is, taxation should be neutral.

There is a general exception to the neutrality principle where a tax corrects for negative spillovers from an investment decision—such as water pollution and carbon emissions. In the absence of defined spillovers, taxes that distort investment decisions result in deadweight losses to society.

It is in the nature of economic rent that its taxation does not reduce incentives for investment. The search for neutrality in taxation is in the first instance a search for economic rent as the tax base.

Investors make decisions based on the expected net present value (ENPV) of an investment proposal. The net present value (NPV) of an investment is the value of future positive cash flows minus future negative cash flows discounted to the present at an appropriate interest rate. The ENPV of a possible investment is the weighted average of possible NPVs, with the weights being determined by the probability of each possible outcome.

Tax neutrality is generally achieved when an investment offering a positive ENPV before tax maintains a positive ENPV after tax. Corporate income tax renders sub‐ marginal any investment that is expected to achieve before tax no more than the normal return on investment obtainable in competitive markets (and some investments with well above normal returns). It does this in two ways. First, it requires investors to deduct their capital expenditures not immediately but over time in accordance with legislated depreciation schedules, ensuring the NPV of those deductions is less than the NPV of the actual expenditures. Second, it allows only incomplete deductions for losses, which especially disadvantages small, innovative businesses.1 Corporate income taxation is applied to the normal or competitive return to capital. As a result, an investment that yields a positive ENPV before tax at a discount rate reflecting a normal return may yield a negative ENPV net of the standard corporate income tax.

For an investment to qualify, the EPNV of an investment in a competitive part of the economy therefore must be expected to earn a before‐tax return in excess of that which would support a positive investment decision in the absence of taxation. A higher rate of standard corporate income taxation would make it harder for investors to achieve their ‘hurdle’ rates of return. A country that applies a higher standard taxation rate will lose out in competition for investment in competitive sectors of the economy with another country applying a lower tax rate to investments that have exactly the same commercial parameters before taxation in the two countries.

In contrast, a two‐sided cash flow tax (with negative and positive cash flows being augmented or taxed at the same rate) does not change the sign of the ENPV of an investment; if the proposed investment has a positive ENPV before tax it will maintain a positive ENPV after tax.

There is one significant exception to the rule that a two‐sided cash flow tax will not affect decisions on whether to commit to an investment. Different investors have different attitudes to risk and losses. Investors are generally understood to be averse to risk and to loss (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Hwang and Satchell 2010), and will value an investment with a lower spread in returns more than one with higher spread, even if they have the same ENPV. Investor risk‐aversion has long been understood to have negative consequences for overall investment and the severity of downturns (Keynes 1936; Zeira 1990; Castro, Clementi and MacDonald 2004). The taxation of positive cash flows and compensation of negative cash flows at the same rate compresses the probability distribution of expected after‐tax outcomes; that is, it makes investments less risky. A two‐sided cash flow tax may therefore affect investment decisions positively, by reducing risk. This particular source of non‐ neutrality of a two‐sided cash flow tax has the potential to raise incentives to invest and gross national income (GNI) above levels in the absence of taxation.

In some circumstances, rent taxation can reduce economic distortions. To the extent that not all expenditure or money or effort on lobbying for policy change is a deductible expense, it reduces the returns on rent‐seeking behaviour. This may raise economic output by reducing the amount of resources dissipated in economically unproductive rent seeking (Tullock 1980; Krueger 1974), or reduce the negative impact of regulatory distortion to protect firms from competition.

Hence an appropriately designed cash flow tax is nearly neutral and to the extent that it is not neutral, it is non‐neutral in desirable ways. It is neutral with respect to whether investment ENVP is positive or negative, because its tax base is the economic rent component of corporate income. It is non‐neutral in reducing investor risks associated with economically valuable investment, and reducing payoffs for economically unproductive rent‐seeking.

Beyond its contribution to economic welfare through increased incentives to productive investment, rent taxation reduces the impact of a rapidly growing and economically unproductive contributor to rising inequality. A large and growing presence of rent tends to increase income and wealth inequality, owing to the narrow ownership of the scarce assets that attract rent. Unlike standard progressive taxation of personal income, rent taxation is progressive without adversely affecting incentives for participation in economically valuable activity.

3. Types of Rent

Economic rent is payment to a factor of production in excess of the minimum required to attract it to, and hold it in, the activity in which it is engaged. In the case of firms, rent is profit above that which is necessary to attract the economically optimal amount of investment into an activity—returns in excess of the supply price of competitive capital. Rent is the return in excess of ‘normal profits’.

Rent persists because competition in the supply of a particular good or service is imperfect or, in some cases, non‐existent.

One apparent source of economic rent is the temporary excess profit that occurs following changes in economic equilibria, which takes time for competition to erode— the phenomenon that Marshall called quasi‐ rent (Marshall 1890). This cannot be taxed away without risking under‐investment in future productive innovation. It is not accurately described as rent. Investment that generates quasi‐rent is not discouraged by the two‐sided cash flow tax proposed in this paper. Investments to generate future income are reimbursed at the same rate at which revenues from the innovation are taxed.

Economic rent arises whenever the presence of high profits in an economic activity fails to induce expansion of supply to reduce prices and profits to normal or competitive levels. The restriction on entry may arise because production requires a specific resource, the supply of which cannot be augmented by investment. Examples include urban and agricultural land and mineral resources. Land and mines that can produce valuable product at lower costs than others, or which are favourably located, cannot be reproduced through investment. The restriction may arise because there are overwhelming economies of scale that make it impossible for a newcomer to compete—as in a network, or an economic activity where lowest cost scale of production is very large compared with the size of the market. They may arise because incumbents earn exceptionally high returns because they happen to have established an oligopolistic position in the market and are prepared to invest part of those returns in predatory behaviour to protect their market power. The restrictions may exist because government law or regulation blocks new entrants. Different sources of rent can interact with and reinforce each other.

Some but not all restrictions that allow rent to persist are economically inefficient. Inefficient rent may be the result of regulatory barriers to competition that serve no public interest. Others arise from privately created monopolies that are in a position to maintain and to exercise market power. It is in the public interest to eliminate these inefficient sources of rent by removing barriers to competitive entry, or by actively promoting competition.

There are several types of rent that emerge from restrictions that increase economic efficiency. One category results from exclusive ownership of a specific land or mineral resource.

There is a sense in which the absence of competitive access to the resource is the result of government action—through the defining and enforcement of private property rights. In the absence of this restriction on competition, private incentives would lead to overall investment in the use of the resource in excess of levels that maximise the value of output. For example, cost‐minimising exploitation of an alluvial gold deposit may allow maximisation of economic value with 1,000 workers employed over 10 years, with half of the value of output accruing as mineral rent to the owner of the resource. A free‐for‐all in a gold rush may see the same or a lesser quantity of gold being mined and revenue achieved with 4,000 miners working for 5 years. The equivalent of 10,000 worker‐years of labour would have been wasted. This is one example of the general phenomenon of ‘the tragedy of the commons’.

Access to urban land is a special case. Planning regulations are necessary to restrict investment to levels that maximise economic value. In the absence of planning restrictions, there is likely to be over‐development of favourable sites, to the point where total economic value is diminished. Here a judicious balance has to be struck between the public interest in full use of the resource, and the public interest in avoiding dissipation of value in overcrowding.

A second category of efficient rent results from government protecting private use of intellectual property resulting from scientific or technological or intellectual or artistic creation. The restriction increases incentives for economically productive investment in innovation, at the same time as it restricts the value generated from access to each creation. As with urban planning, a judicious balance between competing sources of value is necessary for economically optimal outcomes.

A third category of efficient rent is ‘natural monopoly’, associated with ownership of a network, or a physical asset with overwhelming economies of scale, or the two together. Examples of network monopolies are provided by the main information technology and social media platforms. Examples of overwhelmingly large economies of scale include some manufacturing activities (e.g., Diewert and Fox 2008; Angeriz, McCombie and Roberts 2008; Romero and McCombie 2016). Examples of the two together include electricity transmission, gas pipeline and telecommunications hardware systems. Duplication of investments in a natural monopoly may waste resources— while the absence of competition allows the owner of the established assets to maintain high prices and profits at the expense of community welfare.

Some activities generating efficient rent can be subject to regulation of activity or price to increase total economic value. Whatever the source of rent, and however rent may be constrained by regulation, rent can be subject to taxation without sacrifice of economic value.

4. The Prevalence of Rent

The share of rent in GDP has varied widely in the course of modern economic development.

The rent of agricultural land was at the heart of classical economics (Ricardo 1817) and the economic and political systems from which it grew, with agricultural land comprising around half the wealth in Western Europe in the early nineteenth century (Piketty 2013). The rent of private ownership of slaves contributed a large proportion of US income at that time, and the capital value of slaves constituted about half of all wealth in the southern states by the mid‐ nineteenth century (Piketty 2013). Mineral rent has been the main source of income in some resource‐rich countries since the beginnings of the modern economy, and was important globally in the immediate aftermath of the oil price leaps in the 1970s. Rent from the concentration of private ownership of business assets was at the centre of the great fortunes of late nineteenth and early twentieth century America, and its reduction the policy focus of President Theodore Roosevelt (Morris 2001).

In the decades from the late twentieth to the early twenty‐first century, rent has expanded its share of total income. Rent on urban land has grown in parallel with the populations and economic predominance of large cities.

Its importance in many countries now rivals that of agricultural land in early nineteenth century capitalism. The United States, and increasingly China, have seen growth in rent from monopoly control of new intellectual property and from the natural monopolies of information technology networks. Vast new fortunes in the developing world have come disproportionately from private control of natural monopoly utilities and natural resources. In Australia, a high and, over recent decades, an increased proportion of incomes has emanated from rent‐heavy sectors, notably mining, urban real estate, information technology, financial services and large‐scale retailing.

In the United States, where the macro and micro evidence base is developing most rapidly, a range of recent economic analyses has identified an increasing proportion of rent in income from the early 1980s. From 1980 to 2016, returns in excess of normal profits as a share of GDP have grown between four and five fold (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2017, 2018; De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger 2020). See similar findings in Kurz (2017), Dixon and Lim (2017), Barkai (2016) and Díez et al. (2018). This was the central focus of Olivier Blanchard's Presidential Address to the American Economics Association in 2019 (Blanchard 2019). The rise in rent accompanies increases in market concentration, especially in banking, healthcare and ICT (US Council of Economic Advisors 2016; Autor et al. 2017). The US economy has bifurcated into an abundance of firms with low returns and a narrow band of firms with super‐profits: returns for firms that were in the top 10 per cent by profitability rose from 20 per cent per annum in the mid‐1980s to around 100 per cent per annum in recent years. Rent has become more persistent: the odds of a super‐profitable firm still being super‐ profitable 10 years later have doubled since the 1990s to 85 per cent (Furman and Orszag 2015).

The pattern of growing rent is present in many countries. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) find that global average mark‐ups have increased by 52 percentage points since 1980. The increase in G7 countries ranges from around 30 to almost 150 percentage points.

Ingles and Stewart (2018, p. 20) refer to various Australian and US estimates suggesting the normal return on investment represents between 30 and 60 per cent of the corporate return, with various rents constituting the remainder. Murphy (2018, Table 2, p. 6) estimates that 41 per cent of Australian corporate income tax revenue is from rent.

5. Cash Flow Taxes as Rent Taxes

An early version of a cash flow tax was proposed by E Cary Brown (Brown 1948). The Brown Tax compensates investors for negative cash flows at the tax rate and taxes positive net cash flows at the same rate. The two‐sided Brown Tax cannot change the sign of the ENPV of a potential investment from positive to negative.

In a Brown Tax, financing costs are not deductible expenses. Consequently, the Brown Tax cannot distort financing choices between debt and equity, whereas corporate income tax, which allows for interest deductions, favours debt over equity. The Brown Tax is based on annual cash flows. It allows the immediate deduction of capital expenditures, whereas corporate income tax allows for capital expenditures to be written off over time in accordance with legislated depreciation schedules.

In years when cash outflows exceed cash inflows, producing negative cash flows, the government pays to the investing company an amount equal to the negative net cash flow multiplied by the rate of Brown Tax. This feature makes the Brown Tax a two‐sided tax.

While the Brown Tax is efficient in its neutrality and elegant in its simplicity, the obligation of the government of the day to make cash payments to companies may not be politically acceptable in some circumstances.

An alternative cash flow tax is the Resource Rent Tax (RRT) proposed by Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1975) and further developed by Emerson and Garnaut (1984) and Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983). Rather than the government making cash contributions to negative net cash flows as they occur, the RRT provides for them to be carried forward at a risk‐adjusted interest rate to be offset against future positive net cash flows. This accumulation rate is the risk‐free long‐term government bond rate plus a risk premium designed to raise the accumulation rate to the investor's hurdle rate—or supply price of investment. In taxing jurisdictions where sovereign risk is high, and if the particular investment is considered highly risky, the supply price of investment will be high. The accumulation rate will need to be correspondingly high if the discouragement of investments that would be attractive in the absence of tax is to be avoided. 

The RRT is, therefore, a one‐sided tax; it shares in positive NPVs but not in negative ones. It can change the sign of the ENPV of an investment from positive to negative and therefore is not strictly neutral. However, it is more nearly neutral than corporate income tax and most other taxes in practical application around the world (see Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1983 for comprehensive comparisons).

An operating example of the RRT is the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) introduced by the Australian Government in 1987 for application to offshore petroleum developments. The initially legislated accumulation rates for the PRRT were, for exploration expenditure, the long‐term bond rate plus 15 percentage points, and for other expenditure the long‐term bond rate plus 5 percentage points. These and other features of the PRRT were reviewed in 2017 and the accumulation rate for exploration was reduced to the long‐ term bond rate plus 5 percentage points. The rate of the PRRT is 40 per cent. The data required for assessment of PRRT is essentially the same as that required for application of the corporate income tax. It can therefore rely on established tax law and practice—now augmented by two decades of application of the PRRT itself.

A 2010 review of Australia's tax system chaired by then Treasury Secretary Ken Henry (Australian Treasury 2010) recommended a hybrid of the Brown Tax and the Resource Rent Tax for application to mining income. Its Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) was to apply to all Australian mining income. The RSPT would allow negative net cash flows to be carried forward at the Commonwealth bond rate for offsetting against future positive net cash flows. If the investment was abandoned at some time in the future when accumulated cash flows were negative, the government would make a payment to the investor equal to the negative accumulated value multiplied by the tax rate. This payment made the RSPT to some extent two‐sided—to the extent that the government's commitment to make the future payment was credible, and that the Commonwealth bond rate corresponded to the opportunity cost of capital during the period in which the negative cash flows were being carried forward.

Following the Australian Government's announcement of the RSPT in the 2010 Budget, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) invested heavily in an advertising campaign aimed at defeating the tax. Many of its criticisms did not have an analytic basis. One did. Businesses were being expected to rely on government‐legislated assurances that negative net cash flows carried forward would be the subject of a cash refund from a future government. Since this accumulation process could be conducted over decades, rational investors would take account of the risk of these deductions being disallowed through amending legislation. It is reasonable to doubt whether a future government would be certain to honour a distantly preceding government's commitment to provide large cash refunds on unsuccessful investments.

Following the 2010 election, the Australian Government abandoned the RSPT, introducing in its place in 2012 the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) at the rate of 22.5 per cent. This took the form of the PRRT, with special arrangements for historical deductions. The coverage of the MRRT was limited to iron ore, coal and natural gas. An historical cost base for existing projects was negotiated with the mining industry, with the effect of wiping out expected liability for MRRT for a number of years ahead. As deductions from the cost base began to approach exhaustion for some companies, the incoming Australian Government following a 2013 election scrapped the MRRT.

Another approach to rent taxation is the allowance for corporate equity (ACE). It adjusts the normal corporate income tax base by deducting an allowance calculated as a normal, competitive rate of return multiplied by the equity value of the company. In this way, the ACE seeks to exempt from tax the normal, competitive returns on investment, taxing only economic rent. The ACE tax rate would need to be high in order to collect the same amount of revenue as the existing corporate income tax that it would replace.

The ACE is a variant of a general rent tax proposed by Boadway and Bruce (1984), which has become known as the allowance for corporate capital (ACC). Instead of allowing a deduction for a return on equity, as with the ACE, the ACC allows a deduction for a return on debt and equity combined, but interest payments are not deductible.

Recognition of the increasing role of economic rent in corporate income and its perverse effect on economic efficiency and equity in income distribution has led in recent times to the proliferation of suggestions for alternative approaches to taxing rent. For example, Collier (2018) has argued for higher taxation on incomes of large enterprises and of residents in large cities as a way of concentrating taxation more heavily on rent. We see larger gains and smaller losses in seeking an increase in the incidence of taxation on economic rent through an appropriately designed cash flow tax.

Discussion of and experience with alternatives leads us to favour the efficient and elegant two‐sided Brown Tax.

6. Previous Modelling of Rent Taxes

Various efforts have been made to model the fiscal and macro‐economic effects of substituting rent taxes for corporate income tax, or of reducing the corporate income tax rate while introducing a rent tax at a low rate. Prominent among these are the computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling exercises of Murphy (2018) and Dixon and Nassios (2018) in Australia, and Altig et al. (2001) in the United States.

One of Murphy's modelling runs replaces the corporate income tax with the ACC while retaining full dividend imputation. He obtains a gain to consumer welfare of $18 billion but at a cost to revenue of $26 billion. A more modest proposal involves reducing the corporate income tax rate from 30 per cent to 25 per cent and introducing a rent tax at the rate of 8 per cent on the financial sector only. Murphy estimates that, when the effects of the change have fully flowed through the economy, this proposal would collect the same amount of revenue as the established corporate income tax at a rate of 30 per cent, with a welfare gain of $5.4 billion. Murphy's estimates of the gains rely on an assumption that there would be substantially less tax avoidance by multinational corporations at lower rates of corporate income tax. There is no empirical or analytic support for this assumption. More generally, Murphy advocates a corporate income tax rate of 20 per cent, a financial services rent tax and major changes to the dividend imputation system.2

While Murphy estimates the impacts at a point in time after economic adjustment to the new regime, Dixon and Nassios track the path of the adjustment over time. Dixon and Nassios track the effects of reducing the corporate income tax rate to 25 per cent. They take into account the welfare losses to Australian nationals from giving foreign investors a windfall gain on their pre‐ existing Australian investments made in the full expectation of a 30 per cent corporate income tax rate. Dixon and Nassios conclude that the reduction of the tax rate would lead to a fall in national income.

Based on their own tax design analysis and Murphy's modelling, Ingles and Stewart (2018) suggest various options, including combining corporate income tax at a lower rate with a tax that denies interest deductibility and ultimately replacing the corporate income tax with a rent tax. Altig et al. (2001) simulate five possible cash flow tax reforms in the United States. Some of these variants have properties that are improbable in the Australian and indeed the US context, such as the removal of progressive taxation or the application of the tax to housing wealth. Each of the five cash flow taxes is expected to raise investment and national income. The variants closest to our model provide the highest national income and wage gains, of three to six percentage points over 13 years, with gains continuing to grow into the future. By broadening the tax base, they also allow for the lowest capital income taxation rates. The models lack details appropriate to the contemporary Australian context, including the treatment of intellectual property and services, mechanisms of investment expensing, and international tax arbitrage, and are, of course, modelled using US economic data. 

7. Replacing Corporate Income Tax with a Cash Flow Tax

We propose replacing the corporate income tax with a form of cash flow tax that has the two‐sided character of the Brown Tax. The cash flow tax would have as its base net cash flows, being taxable revenues (excluding any interest income) less non‐financing cash outlays (operating costs plus capital expenditure, but with no allowance for interest or other financing costs). The accounting data for revenues and expenditures would be exactly the same as for corporate income tax and the PRRT, so that established case law would apply. No distinction is drawn between capital and recurrent expenditure.

For typical capital‐intensive projects, net cash flows in the early years will be negative. Negative cash flows could also arise late in the life of a project when large capital expenditure is required for refurbishments or dismantlement of ageing assets such as oil and gas platforms or, possibly, in years of low prices and sales revenue. In years when negative net cash flows are recorded, we propose that an amount equal to the negative net cash flow multiplied by the tax rate be certified by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and rebated to the taxpayer. If political judgements weighed against a straightforward rebate, the certified cash loss could be made available for offset against any cash flow tax payable by any entity. The taxpayer would be permitted to sell the certified amount to another company for offset against its own current cash flow tax liabilities. The private sector, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) or the ATO could create a market for such offsets, which would trade at face value minus transaction costs.

8. Specific Design Issues

8.1 Treatment of the Financial Sector

Our analysis of the treatment of financial flows under a cash flow tax follows the structure laid out by the Meade (1978) Committee on UK tax reform, which has since become conventional. The Committee drew a distinction between flows resulting from real transactions and those from purely financial transactions. Following Meade Committee notation, take R as real inflows and R̅ as real outflows, and F as financial inflows and F̅ as financial outflows (see Table 1, from Auerbach et al. 2017). The two standard options for structuring the tax base are:

·        An R‐base, taxing real inflows net of real outflows only: R − R̅

·        An R + F‐base, adding financial inflows and deducting financial outflows: (R + F) – (R̅ + F̅)

Choosing between these options has proven challenging for past specifications of a cash flow tax. The R+F‐base has the advantage of taxing the rent of financial institutions, but imposes prohibitively complex tax accounting requirements on businesses and may encourage perverse profit deferral (Auerbach et al. 2017; see Poddar and English 1997; Zee 2005 for some untested approaches to simplification). The R‐base, on the other hand, may substantially simplify tax calculations compared to the existing corporate income tax and may even be automated for many smaller businesses (US President's Tax Reform Panel, 2005), but excludes financial flows from its coverage.

We propose avoiding these problems by combining an R‐base cash flow tax for all except financial firms, with separate provisions for the taxation of financial firms. For simplicity, we propose taxing financial firms under the existing corporate income tax regime, but with the immediate expensing of investment. Taxable income for financial firms would be interest received minus interest paid, plus fees, minus current costs and capital expenditure. This modified corporate income tax—the Financial Sector Income Tax (FSIT)—is similar to the Financial Activities Tax, or FAT, proposed by IMF staff (Claessens, Keen and Pazarbasioglu 2010; Keen, Krelove and Norregaard 2016), and the Financial Services Tax proposed by Henry's Future Tax System Review (2010). Our proposal would require no changes in data collection compared to the existing corporate income tax so it can be readily implemented. 

The FSIT would be applied at the same rate as the cash flow tax. A single rate across all activities removes one potential incentive to disguise financial flows as real flows, and vice versa, hence reducing the burden of enforcing the border between real and financial flows for financial firms. Non‐financial firms will face incentives to disguise some real flows as financial flows. As suggested in Auerbach et al. (2017), quasi‐ financial transactions, such as delayed payment schemes, would be treated as real flows. Non‐financial firms engaged in limited but substantial financial activities over a specified threshold may be obliged to submit tax returns for the cash flow tax and FSIT.

8.2 Countering Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

Multinational corporations shift profits to tax havens or to lower‐tax jurisdictions through inflated related‐party interest payments (from artificially high gearing or artificially high interest rates, or both); transfer pricing between related parties for sales (including through dedicated marketing hubs in low‐tax jurisdictions); and inflation of technology and management fees to affiliates. Global digital corporations are famously adept at using technology and management fees to shift profits to low‐tax or zero‐tax jurisdictions.

A cash flow tax removes tax avoidance problems arising from artificially high gearing and high interest rates for loans from related parties by excluding financial transactions from its base.

We propose removing problems from technology and management fees paid to foreign affiliates by allowing no deduction for imported services, unless the taxpayer demonstrates that they relate to current expenditure on goods and services directly required for the sale to the Australian taxpayer. For foreign investment in research and development, the presumption is that earnings from sales to Australia are an economic rent—except to the extent that they require specific expenditure on adaptation to Australian conditions. This is unlikely to cause any reduction in global research and development, given the small proportion of expected early sales to Australia in the technology firms’ plans for investment.

Payments for Australian technology and other services would be deductible as in the current corporate income tax, but with immediate expensing of all expenditure on research and development. Immediate expensing with provision for compensation of negative cash flows at the tax rate would be highly encouraging of Australian investment in research and development. Existing incentives for Australian research and development have their justification in externalities and should not be affected by the changes in taxation.

An anonymous referee has commented that the proposal for denying deductions for imported services that are not directly related to sales to Australia could be introduced into the existing corporate tax system, independently of the shift to the cash flow tax. That would cause the existing corporate tax to raise more revenue than it does now. While that is true, the treatment that we propose for imported services sits more comfortably within the logic of a rent tax than a standard corporate income tax. However, we have no objection to a reader choosing to see our proposed reform as a package of two reforms: the shift to a cash flow case for corporate taxation; and the proposed treatment of deductions for imported services. The revenue effects of the proposed reforms are then the revenue effects of the package. Within this package, the denial of the deductions for imported services unless there is a direct link to provision of the services in Australia would account for about $12 billion of the $162 billion contributed by the Cash Flow Tax in 2029–30. The denial of the deductions for imported services would account for about $73 billion of the $1,180b contributed over the decade 2020–21 to 2029–30.

An anonymous referee has commented that our paper is directed to corporate income alone, and not to business income, and suggested that we should spell out how other business income would be treated. There would be additional efficiency gains in extending the proposal to all business income. That is an appropriate focus of future effort by a government committed to changing the standard corporate income tax to a cash flow tax. We have not included this extension of the proposal in our revenue estimates.

9. Arrangements for Transition and Effects on Revenue

We propose phasing in a cash flow tax while simultaneously phasing out the existing corporate income tax under an ‘irrevocable switch’ scheme.

An irrevocable switch scheme enables any taxpayer to elect in any year in the first 10 years of the new tax system to immediately and fully switch from corporate income tax to cash flow tax. If there has been no prior election, the switch would occur after the 10th year.

We envisage the FSIT applying to financial institutions from the beginning of the transition. The FSIT is more favourable to banks than the established corporate income tax.

For this scenario we model the revenue impact of the reform with a 30 per cent tax rate. We take as the 10‐year transition period 2020–21 to 2029–30.

Summary outcomes under each option for the final year of the transition period are presented in Table 2. The results relate to Australian companies with aggregated annual turnover above $25 million. The methodology underpinning the calculations is provided in the Appendix.

By moving to a cash flow base, taxable income is increased by $128.2 billion in 2029–30. If the cash flow tax rate were maintained at 30 per cent, the increase in tax collection above the existing corporate income tax is an estimated $37.5 billion.

 

The transition path of the estimated tax payable under the irrevocable switch scheme over the period 2020–2021 to 2029–30 is presented in Figure 1. By the year 2029–30 the revenue for the cash flow tax is estimated to be $179.1 billion and the revenue from corporate tax $141.6 billion.

Our modelling assumes 50 per cent of companies switch in the first year while the rest switch in the 10th year. This assumption is based on likely corporate responses to the opportunity to increase the present value of deductions by taking them earlier. We expect that business investment would be much larger under the cash flow tax, but we have modelled future revenues on the basis that there is no change in levels of investment. Higher investment would reduce taxation revenues early in the period, and increase them later by larger amounts.

Under the irrevocable switch scheme, higher levels of capital expenditure are assumed in the first 2 years of the transition period, resulting in negative revenue outcomes before recovering and overtaking projected revenues from the company tax in the third year. The pattern of capital investment under the scheme is depicted in Figure 2. The spending profile shows significant front‐ loading in the early years as companies take advantage of immediate deductions of their investment expenditure.

In our estimates of additional tax revenue under the cash flow tax, we have endeavoured to use the best available public data. We have sought to overcome the apparent behavioural bias in publicly available data sources collated by the ATO embedded in the ATO's International Dealings Schedule, which experts have told us may tend to understate taxable income reported in Australia.3 Our approach has also been sense‐tested by professionals with deep experience in international dealings. We believe our projections are conservative, since they do not account for second‐round efficiency gains that are likely to increase productive investment and other economic activity and hence contribute to larger revenues (as identified in Altig et al. 2001).

Why are the estimated revenues from taxing rent via the cash flow tax larger than from the standard corporate income tax? Cross‐checking of our estimates reveals that most of the estimated revenue gain is attributable to taxable entities with international dealings. These estimated revenue gains come from privately held companies —international branches of foreign‐owned and Australian‐owned enterprises. The proposed approach reduces revenue leakage associated with transfer pricing surrounding global supply of capital, intellectual property and conventional physical supply chains.

Material problems that arise around transfer pricing by consolidated operations include:

(i)       contract production of factory‐less goods (for example, Apple does not produce iPhones in Australia but charges the branch office for the intellectual property);

(ii)      the creation of special‐purpose entities where intellectual property is parked by foreign affiliates (for example, Ireland, a tax shelter, saw GDP jump by 26 per cent in 20154 because of a one‐off sale of a special purpose entity); and

(iii)     use of debt by large capital importers to reduce Australian income.5

10. Preferred Transition Approach

Companies that had incurred large amounts of debt in the period prior to the introduction of the cash flow tax, and have low expectations of capital expenditure in future, are likely to opt to remain in the corporate income tax system for as long as possible, enabling them to claim deductions for interest paid. Companies with big investment plans during the early years of the transition will have an incentive to switch to the cash flow tax, enabling them to immediately expense all eligible capital investment. Still other companies might opt into the cash flow tax during the middle of the transition, having claimed interest deductions on prior investments for corporate income tax purposes and looking forward to obtaining the benefits of immediate expensing of new capital expenditures under the cash flow tax. Firms incurring or expecting to incur negative cash flows as a result of recession are likely to opt for immediate transfer to the cash flow tax.

Financial companies would be subject to a FSIT from the beginning. This is the existing corporate income tax regime, but with immediate expensing of investment.

11. Conclusions

We have formed and tested the view that replacing the corporate income tax with a cash flow tax with the design set out in this paper would contribute substantially to efficiency and economic growth, and to a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. It would protect the Australian fiscal system from the contemporary ‘race to the bottom’ in international rates of taxation of corporate income, and it would remove a number of distortions inherent in the current system of corporate income taxation.

The cash flow tax would substantially improve the trade‐off between the amount of tax collected and incentives to invest in activities that would raise Australian output and incomes. It would remove taxation on normal profits—the expected income of firms operating in a competitive environment. This would include most small and medium‐sized businesses.

The cash flow tax would substantially increase incentives for investment—or rather, remove powerful disincentives inherent in the standard corporate income tax for investment in capital‐intensive, long‐lived and more risky investments.

The cash flow tax would encourage investment in innovation, including, but not only, through research and development. It would do this by compressing the probability distribution of expected outcomes of investments—unsuccessful investments would be compensated at the cash flow tax rate. The recoupment of ‘tax losses’ at the tax rate from early years of negative cash flows would also support the financing of innovative investments, including those requiring research and development.

The cash flow tax would systematically favour small businesses in comparison with their treatment under the standard corporate income tax. They are much more likely to attract tax losses because of the competitive environment in which they operate and the greater likelihood that their losses will never be recouped under established arrangements.

The cash flow tax would remove incentives to distort financing structures to avoid tax, by artificially inflating reliance on debt. This is likely to contribute positively to efficiency. The removal of artificial encouragement to debt financing would make the economy less vulnerable to financial crises.

The cash flow tax would remove or greatly reduce the main opportunities currently used for avoiding and evading Australian corporate income taxation—artificially high interest payments and foreign technology and management fees.

It would also remove a large, systematic bias in favour of foreign and larger enterprises against Australian‐owned and smaller enterprises in the current corporate tax system, through removing opportunities for avoidance and evasion that are generally more readily available to foreign and larger enterprises.

The cash flow tax would be more equitable, because its incidence would be larger on high incomes, as a result of the concentration of ownership of corporations earning large amounts of economic rent.

The cash flow tax would reduce incentives for rent‐seeking pressures on government to introduce laws and regulations that reduce competition. It may therefore contribute to economic efficiency, output and incomes in two ways: by reducing the waste of resources in rent‐seeking behaviour; and by reducing deadweight losses from regulatory distortions as a result of rent‐seeking pressure on government.

Finally, the introduction of the cash flow tax now would be highly expansionary, at the time when the economy needs stimulus of demand. With taxpayers free to choose when they move to the new tax, those with large investment plans would shift to the new regime and be more likely to make larger and earlier investments. Companies, especially small businesses, incurring losses now in the pandemic recession would receive partial reimbursement for those losses. These sources of loss to the revenue are advantageous now on macro‐economic policy grounds. The macro‐economic stimulus would be automatically withdrawn as operating losses fall as the economy moves out of recession and early recipients of tax offsets for early investments qualify for smaller deductions in later years than they would have done.

We have designed the proposed cash flow tax to be relatively easy to implement, drawing mainly from concepts and data that are required in assessment of the current corporate income tax and Petroleum Resource Rent Tax. We have introduced transitional arrangements that would avoid sudden and large changes that detract substantially from the expectations of established businesses.

The best publicly available data has shortcomings, and we look forward to our estimates being improved by bodies like the Australian Treasury with the assistance of the ATO, which has access to more up‐to‐date data and a better understanding of the impact of recent international tax compliance initiatives.

We are confident that the various benefits to economic efficiency and economic growth outlined above would lead to a substantial increase in investment, productivity and incomes. There would be a decisive shift in the tax burden toward enterprises generating income from rent with little new investment, and away from businesses prepared to make large commitments to new investments. The increased incentives for investment would be especially strong in the competitive parts of the economy, where small and medium‐sized businesses are dominant.

Endnotes

 

1.   Presently, businesses making losses can carry them forward for seven years at zero interest only. With deductions less than the NPV of expenditures, this is a disincentive for investment. More significantly, small businesses are less likely to survive long enough to benefit from loss deductibility. This inefficiently discourages small business from pursuing positive‐ENPV innovations. 

2.   Murphy (2018), p. 32.

3.   The aggregate company tax data presented by the ATO in its Australian Taxation Statistics publication and associated detailed table presents the most detailed, line‐by‐line, breakdown of the contributions of various revenue and expenditure items to reported company tax payable. However, for international dealings, the summary table which aggregates all information presents only a partial summary of the entirety of all transactions engaged in by entities. This gives taxpayers an opportunity to filter what they report and scope to understate their tax payable from overseas transactions. Also, there is no arithmetic check‐sum for the incomplete set of international dealings that are reported by an entity back to the company tax return. Therefore, we believe the international summary reported by the ATO will tend to systematically understate the tax payable by entities. Evidence for this is the fact that collectively, international corporations have constantly run multi‐billion dollar losses year after year. Our projections incorporate an adjustment factor to reflect the recent enhanced enforcement activities by the ATO in international dealings.

4.   OECD 2016, Irish GDP up by 26.3% in 2015? viewed 13 November 2018 .

5.   While the ATO uses thin capitalisation rules to limit these impacts, the regulations are still quite malleable.

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Appendix:

 

Methodology of Tax Modelling Our tax modelling is based on publicly available data sources including the ATO's Tax Statistics, S&P's Capital IQ database of Australian listed company data, ABS CAPEX data and Ruthven Institute company data.

The bulk of the modelling was benchmarked on the latest ATO Tax Statistics for the income tax year 2016–17 using Detailed Tables 1a, 6a and 8.

1.   We categorised all companies into 3 distinct groups:

a. Resident tax status Australian owned;

b. Resident tax status foreign owned; and

c. Non‐resident tax status foreign owned.

2.   For the cash flow tax scheme, for companies other than banks, we exclude the following revenue/expense items in Garnaut et al.: Replacing Corporate Income Tax 479 © 2020 The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research, Faculty of Business and Economics Table 1a—Companies: Selected items, for income year 2016–17:

 – Revenue: Gross interest and Unrealised gains on revaluation of assets to fair value.

 – Expenditure: Interest expenses within Australia, Interest expense overseas, Royalty expenses overseas, Depreciation expenses and Unrealised losses on revaluation of assets to fair value. All companies are entitled to the immediate expensing of CAPEX.

3.   For the cash flow tax scheme, we did not adjust Australian listed banks* for either:

–    Gross interest receipts; or

–    Interest expenses within Australia.

*Australian listed banks include: ANZ, CBA, NAB, WBC, BOQ, BEN, MQG and ABA. The interest items were obtained from S&P Capital IQ and aggregated. Banks are still entitled to the immediate expensing of CAPEX.

4.   To obtain sales revenue and cost of goods sold for foreign companies with resident tax status, we obtained the 5‐year average (from 2012–13 to 2016–17) of each revenue and expense items from Table 8—International Dealings before we aggregate them. Under cash flow tax scheme, we exclude the following revenue/expenses items:

–    Revenue: Dealings with international related parties; Treasury related services; Management and administration services; Insurance; Reinsurance; Sales and marketing services; Software and information technology services; Technical services; Asset management; Other services; Derivatives; Guarantees; Other financial dealings; and Other revenues.

–    Expenditure: Dealings with international related parties; Treasury related services; Management and administration services; Insurance; Reinsurance; Sales and marketing services; Software and information technology services; Technical services; Asset management; Other services; Derivatives; Guarantees; Other financial dealings; and Other revenues.

5.   We then adjusted both revenue and expenditure items from international dealings (excluding those items listed above) to account for the enhanced enforcement effects from measures taken by the ATO such as the Diverted Profits Tax (DPT) to ensure significant global entities pay tax given their significant economic activity in Australia. We implement this by adjusting the 5‐year average International Dealings Schedule (IDS) net losses by 20 per cent.

6.   Certain items in the Reconciliation to tax payable are excluded based on our reading of Tables 1a and 8, and consistent with structure of the tax reforms proposals outlined previously and our subjective line‐items assessment of each item contained in the sheets.

7.   We select 2020–21 to be the starting year for the cash flow tax transition for the ten‐ year period to 2029–30. We then match the Treasurer's estimates of the Commonwealth's company tax revenues by line item from 2016–17 over the outlook to 2022–23). For subsequent years we project tax revenue forward to 2029–30 by assuming a nominal annual growth rate of revenue and expenditure items of 4.50 per cent on average.

8.   For convenience we use tax payable as the measure of tax revenue, not net tax.

9.            We sourced our initial CAPEX value for 2016–17 from ABS 5206.0 National Accounts. The value ($167.9b) includes total non‐dwelling construction (excluding net purchases of second‐hand assets) and total machinery and equipment. This figure does not include the acquisition of intellectual property products. We've also verified with the ABS that this amount does not include the purchase of land.

10. As mentioned previously, CAPEX is fully deductible under all cash flow tax options. Under the irrevocable transition scheme, 50 per cent of companies are assumed to switch immediately to the cash flow tax while the remainder switch in 2029–30 (refer to Figure 1). For companies that elect to switch, their CAPEX is modified so that in aggregate, a significant portion of CAPEX will take place in the first two years of the transition period. However, the total CAPEX amount from 2020–21 to 2029–30 will be unchanged.

11. We have sought to confirm our primary analysis by comparison with listed company data published by S&P and via consultations with the Australian Taxation Office.

*    Garnaut: The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010 Australia; Emerson: Victoria University, The Australian National University, Australian Capital Territory 2600 Australia and RMIT, Victoria 3000 Australia; Finighan: London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE United Kingdom; Anthony: Industry Super Australia, Victoria 3000 Australia. Corresponding author: Garnaut, email <ross.garnaut@unimelb.edu.au>. The authors acknowledge helpful suggestions from colleagues at seminars at the Melbourne Economic Forum, the Committee for Economic Development of Australia and the Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Melbourne, and from an anonymous referee

Source: https://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/...

Free speech is not a free pass

The right to freedom of expression cannot be interpreted as a right to incite crime or violence.

Given all the words spoken about free speech in the last week or so, it would be easy to leave the matter behind and move onto something new like our quarantine system. But as the son of a World War II veteran who fought fascism and spent the rest of the war in a prisoner of war camp, it would dishonour him to let some of the absurd and dangerous arguments go unchallenged.

Pre-war Nazi Germany taught us that fascism does not spring up overnight. It gathers momentum over time as good people feel too intimidated to speak up or decide that to do so would give fascists the notoriety they crave.

Neither prime minister Morrison nor acting prime minister McCormack was willing to criticise an American president for inciting violence by white supremacists who broke into the Capitol, ransacked offices of members of Congress and killed a policeman – though they did condemn the insurgents.

Harsh utterances of an American President in an American political contest are not ordinarily an Australian leader’s business, but a world leader inciting violence certainly is. Our leaders wouldn’t hesitate to condemn an ayatollah for inciting violence against westerners. Nor should they.

When ethical matters like this arise, I usually ask myself: “What would Bob Hawke have done?” We have a ready-made answer. When China’s leaders ordered violent repression of students at Tiananmen Square in 1989, Hawke, in tears, condemned them utterly and announced, with no reference to Cabinet, that the 40,000 Chinese students in Australia could stay permanently.

Despite no Australian lives being threatened, Hawke did not take the view that the behaviour of the Chinese leadership was none of his business.

Lest there be any doubt about whether the US President actually incited violence, the Member for Wentworth, Dave Sharma, pointed out https://www.smh.com.au/national/twitter-s-decision-to-ban-donald-trump-is-chilling-if-you-care-about-free-speech-20210112-p56thk.html that Trump had urged his supporters to “fight much harder”, warning them that “you’ll never take back our country with weakness ... you have to show strength”, and telling them “if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.”

Trump used Twitter to lie repeatedly that the election had been rigged by supporters of the Democrats. The white supremacists didn’t need any further encouragement in storming the Capitol, killing a policeman and ransacking the place.

One insurgent wore a sweater emblazoned with “Camp Auschwitz” and another with "6MWE"—a Neo-Nazi term meaning "6 million wasn't enough."

Joining President-elect Biden in condemning Trump were the leaders of Britain, Germany, France, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland and Sweden – but not of Australia.

In my father’s war diary, written at Stalag VIIIC, not too far from Auschwitz, he wrote of the Jews who had been transferred to Germany from the same Italian prisoner of war camp as the Australians following Italy’s capitulation: “We often wonder what became of the Jews from P.G. 57, who were on a different train to us.” He added of the Germans: “The hatred for the Jews cannot be imagined so it is impossible to describe it.” 

Yet despite the unspeakable treatment of Jewish people during the Holocaust, sections of the political right in Australia have expressed outrage that media outlets have declined to give Trump and his ilk further opportunities to sow hatred and incite violence.

Dave Sharma acknowledged that Twitter had a strong case for banning Trump, but quickly claimed anyone with a commitment to free speech “should find the whole episode chilling.” He then lamented that Trump had been “stripped of his political voice, silenced, without reference to any law, and without the involvement of any court.” 

Inciting violence is a crime. Twitter had been captioning Trump’s numerous tweets falsely claiming the election had been stolen with warnings that these tweets were not necessarily true. What was Twitter to do following Trump’s inciting of violence? Enable a crime to be committed again and again in the name of free speech? And by so enabling, run the gauntlet of a court case alleging that Twitter had been complicit in criminal behaviour?

Trump had not been silenced. As President of the United States, he could have called as many media conferences as he liked. Media outlets are not obliged by the principle of free speech to report his every utterance whether true or false.

Sharma was not a lone voice. Executive Director of the Institute of Public Affairs, John Roskam https://www.afr.com/politics/beware-the-anti-trump-tyrants-20210113-p56tvx acknowledged that Twitter and YouTube were free to ban Trump from their platforms, but added their decision was wrong but they were allowed “to exercise that freedom to be partisan hypocrites.”

We don’t accept as an expression of free speech the dissemination of images of child sexual exploitation. It is a crime. What a bizarre situation we would have if we accepted that using a social media platform to enable crimes was justified in the name of liberty and free speech.

In Australia, the extreme right-wing threat is real and it is growing. In suburbs around Australia, small cells regularly meet to salute Nazi flags, inspect weapons, train in combat and share their hateful ideology. If that sounds alarmist, consider this: it is verbatim from the Director-General of ASIO’s annual threat assessment https://www.asio.gov.au/publications/speeches-and-statements/director-general-annual-threat-assessment-0.html

According to ASIO’s most recent annual report, extreme right-wing individuals comprised around one-third of all ASIO counter-terrorism investigative subjects. And ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess warned just last month that extremists such as neo-Nazis are more organised, sophisticated and ideologically driven than before.

Rather than worrying about Donald Trump’s civil liberties to incite violence we should be concerned about the rise of right-wing extremism, just as we continue to be concerned by Islamic extremism.

In 2018, in the memory of my father, his war-time comrades and the six million Jews who died in the Holocaust, I quit as a Sky TV commentator https://www.afr.com/opinion/why-craig-emerson-quit-sky-news-over-the-balir-cottrell-neonazi-interview-20180806-h13m3t when it decided to do a puff-piece interview of a neo-Nazi. Last week, Australian right-wing politicians and commentators should have condemned Trump’s actions to demonstrate that they take the threat of violent fascism seriously.

 Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/free-sp...

Song that's better tuned to a nation

A new anthem that energises reconciliation is one legacy that a conservative like Scott Morrison could pull off.

A one-word change to Australia’s national anthem, announced by Prime Minister Scott Morrison on Australia Day, is a symbol of progress towards reconciliation. A new anthem that recognises prior Indigenous occupation of the continent would be worthy in its own right while also starting the engine to take us to more fulsome reconciliation.

Credit should be given where it is due: Morrison’s initiative is welcome because it ends the fiction in Advance Australia Fair that ours is a young country when Indigenous people were here at least 60,000 years ago.

Progress has been a long time coming. Thirty-three years ago, along with the late Bob Sorby and Minister Gerry Hand, I was on the tarmac at Alice Springs with Prime Minister Bob Hawke, following the 1987 election. We had flown there on the official jet to announce that the third-term Hawke government would begin consultation on an agreement with Indigenous people for signing in 1988, the Bicentenary of European settlement.

Bob had written a note he gave me that I still have: “The government believes it is essential as we come to the Bicentenary year to recognise that two hundred years of European settlement comes after forty thousand years of Aboriginal history. The government will explore how best to reflect that recognition and the obligations which this involves for the whole community.”

The agreement – whether a compact or a treaty – never got airborne; but perhaps the Morrison initiative is a flickering light signifying that there is hope yet.

In his dying days, Hawke lamented to me several times that his greatest disappointment was his lack of success in achieving reconciliation.

Bob’s interest in land rights was mugged by the reality of West Australian politics. Labor premier Brian Burke had counselled Bob that if he were to move on land rights, the mining industry would launch a well-funded campaign, warning city people that their backyards were at risk of land claims.

In 1988, we attended the Barunga Festival where elders presented Bob with the Barunga Statement. Further to a national system of land rights, it called for a national, elected Aboriginal and Islander organisation to oversee Indigenous affairs.

The Hawke government, through Gerry Hand, delivered the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) but it was abolished by the Howard government in 2004 after a series of controversies.

The Keating government erected a beacon of hope on the tarmac through the Native Title Act of 1993 that gave legislative force to the High Court’s Mabo decision. Keating faced fierce opposition from outside the Parliamentary Labor Party and from within, but resolutely pushed the legislation through the Senate – with the support of Queensland premier Wayne Goss as advised by a young Kevin Rudd.

In 2008, Prime Minister Rudd issued a parliamentary apology to the Stolen Generation.

Now, processes are underway to advance the positions stated in the Uluru Statement of the Heart released in 2017, which would require constitutional and legislative change. These processes are being overseen by a senior advisory group co-chaired by Professors Tom Calma and the irrepressible Marcia Langton.

A new national anthem need not detract from these processes. Twenty years ago, as a parliamentary backbencher, I launched a campaign to replace Advance Australia Fair with an adaptation of I Am Australian written by former member of the Seekers, Bruce Woodley.

A new anthem could help energise non-Indigenous Australians in favour of reconciliation, the goals of the Statement of the Heart and constitutional recognition of prior occupation by Indigenous people.

I Am Australian has been sung by schoolchildren for more than two decades. As adults, these young people would take little convincing of its superiority over an anthem that recognises not prior Indigenous occupation but that we live on an island that is “girt by sea.”

An alternative, written by another former Seekers member, Judith Durham, in collaboration with Indigenous people, retains the music of Advance Australia Fair while replacing the lyrics with delightful words replete with sentiments of reconciliation.

My proposal is for a plebiscite, like the one that led to the Hawke government in 1984 to replace God Save the Queen with Advance Australia Fair. Australians could be asked to choose from three candidates: the present anthem, the Judith Durham version and an adaptation of I Am Australian.

Realistically, Australia’s gun laws could have been enacted only by a conservative government. They were John Howard’s greatest achievement. Every prime minister wants a legacy. Reconciliation could be Scott Morrison’s.

A new anthem wouldn’t fix Indigenous disadvantage or achieve the goals of the Statement of the Heart, but it might get the plane, stalled on the tarmac at Alice Springs, its taillight flickering, moving along the runway. Anything, anything at all, would be better than mindlessly observing that our island home is girt by sea.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/song-th...

How 2020 turned out to be a blurred vision

The leading Australians who attended a 2020 future forum a quarter of a century ago would probably be underwhelmed at outcomes. But they did pick the smartphone.

A quarter century ago, I co-convened a series of forums inviting prominent Australians to share their visions for Australia for the year 2020. Not one of them predicted a global viral pandemic. As clairvoyants they were hopeless but as 2020 visionaries they were superb. As the horror year draws to a close, it’s worth reviewing their aspirations for Australia and the extent they have been realised.

 The 10 visionaries were Bob Hawke, Malcolm Turnbull, Liberal deputy leader Michael Wooldridge, Peter Garrett, Wayne Goss, Dale Spender, Ross Garnaut, Cheryl Saunders, Hugh Mackay and Rick Farley. My co-convenor was Fleur Kingham, now President of the Land Court of Queensland.

 Bob Hawke aspired for a multicultural Australia of continuing natural splendour, where indigenous and non-indigenous cultures are reconciled, imbued with a deep sense of fairness, respecting its seniors as wise elders and comfortable with its enmeshment with Asia.

 Hawke’s big policy idea was to abolish the states. Yet, as Wayne Goss pointed out in his forum, any referendum to get rid of the states would fail spectacularly. Goss nevertheless advocated a comprehensive rationalisation of responsibilities between the states and the Commonwealth. Although the Council of Australian Governments had been established for this purpose, meagre progress has been made.

 An endearingly irascible Malcolm Turnbull showed no tolerance for Monarchists in his quest for an Australian Republic. Like constitutional law professor Cheryl Saunders, Turnbull advocated the election of a President by a two-thirds majority of the two houses of Federal Parliament. He strongly rejected direct election of the President by the people on the basis that the President would have higher standing in the community than the Prime Minister, who is not directly elected.

 In the 1999 referendum the Australian people disagreed with this proposal, no state supporting the change.

 Though the world wide web was only a few years old when Hugh Mackay hosted his forum, he foresaw electronic mega-communities but hoped we would not be diverted from our personal relationships. You be the judge: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and the like certainly have had a depersonalising effect.

 Wooldridge similarly hoped our cities would cater for the spiritual and emotional needs of their residents. Yet we are still commissioning reports into mental health with no official response on how to improve it.

 Wooldridge prophesised a society where television sets were equipped with digital memory and citizens would own a hand-held personal digital assistant combining computer, calculator and telephone. In 2020, smart TVs and smart phones are everyday devices.

Garnaut foresaw the Asian Century, predicting the centre of global economic activity would shift from North America and Europe to Asia. His recommendation for further Australian tariff reductions has been implemented but his proposal for a guaranteed minimum income for all Australians has not. Expect more on this in his forthcoming book, RESET: Restoring Australia After the Pandemic Recession, due out in late-February next year.

Rick Farley supported the Keating government’s native title legislation while arguing for stronger rights than those provided for in the High Court’s Mabo decision. Within a couple of years, through the Wik judgement, the High Court would oblige. But Farley’s other aspiration, for the constitutional recognition of indigenous prior occupation of Australia, seems as far away as ever.

Peter Garrett envisaged an Australia in which solar and wind provided at least half its energy needs. Yet in 2020 they contributed little more than 20 per cent. If Australia remains a laggard in emission reductions, it risks being hit with carbon tariffs by a customs union of high-ambition countries that includes Europe and the United States https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/morrison-left-exposed-to-climate-damage-by-biden-win-20201109-p56cpv

Dale Spender reminded the audience that women still had a long way to go to achieve equality with men, warning that the digital age could make this harder.

Overall, how would these visionaries rate Australia today?

Ours is a multicultural society – against the protestations of the One Nation Party whose emergence would have horrified them. The mainstream conservative political parties have largely refrained from race-based politics, with the notable exception of the targeting of the Sudanese community during the last Victorian election campaign.

We have not provided the care our elders need and deserve, as acknowledged by a Royal Commission into aged care.

Whatever the official statistics might say, we do not consider our society to have become fairer – for the underprivileged, people with mental health issues or women, who continue to suffer a gender pay gap, income gap and superannuation gap.

We are a long way short of ecological sustainability and our national government is not taking climate change seriously, treating it largely as an obsession of so-called woke, inner-city elites.

Our performance on reconciliation and constitutional recognition of indigenous prior occupation of Australia has been abysmal. The Republican Movement soldiers on, with no outcome in sight. Australia is enmeshed with Asia but is having a hard time with our biggest market, China.

All told, our visionaries would be disappointed. Yet most of us could not think of another country where we would rather live. Let’s celebrate our achievements over the holidays and pledge to do a lot better in 2021 and over the next 25 years.

Craig Emerson is Director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT, a Distinguished Fellow at the ANU and an adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/how-202...

We must think Chinese and act Australian

It is not panda hugging to better understand China's history and avoid our own unforced errors.

As the Australia-China relationship sinks to new lows, advice on whether and how to improve it is not in short supply. Having been an economic and trade adviser to Bob Hawke when the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre occurred, and trade minister when Julia Gillard secured a strategic partnership with China in 2013, I have witnessed at close quarters the highs and lows of Australia-China relations. What can be viewed as impossibly complicated is, in many situations, remarkably simple if a basic process is followed: think Chinese, act Australian.

Western foreign policy has faltered and erred when its architects have failed even to try to understand how non-Western societies and their leaders think. Australia was drawn into the Vietnam War by the Domino Theory of communism emanating from China and descending into Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet anyone who had studied the history of China and Vietnam would have known that China had dominated Vietnam many times going as far back as 111BC.

Nor, as communist countries, had China and the Soviet Union been good mates, Deng Xiaoping telling Bob Hawke that a catalyst for his decision to open up China’s economy to the world was the perceived threat of its northern neighbour.

China’s leadership laments the Century of Humiliation, from 1839 to 1949, when it was subjugated to Western powers, Russia and Japan. What looks to the West like Chinese military expansionism through its behaviour in the South China Sea is clearly that, but it can also be explained in part by China’s determination to never again be humiliated.

Setting out these few facts will earn me a reputation among the Hard Right of Australian politicians as a “panda hugger”– which is unfortunate, since I did hug a baby Panda as it sat on my lap in Chengdu chewing on sugar cane I fed it (see incriminating photo).

Understanding the way the Chinese leadership thinks does not oblige the Australian Government to agree with it. But nor should it entail attributing to China’s leaders the worst of motives and intentions.

A constant in the Australia-China relationship has been our concern with human rights in China. Before the treatment of the Uighurs, Australia consistently expressed its concerns with China’s treatment of Tibet. And Bob Hawke could not have been more expressive in his condemnation of the Tiananmen Square massacre, granting permanent residence to all Chinese students studying in Australia at the time.

Prime Minister Gillard raised human rights issues in our meeting with recently elected President Xi Jinping in 2013. The meeting did not end abruptly or with acrimony.

Is it, then, so momentous, that a middle-ranking Chinese official, in a disgraceful way, raised the issue of atrocities by some Australian soldiers in Afghanistan? If an official in an Australian Government Department had condemned China for an incident of human rights abuse, neither President Xi Jinping nor Premier Li Keqiang would have responded.

But Australia’s Prime Minister did. In the era of old technology, the sage advice was that, if writing a letter in anger, put it on the top of the fridge overnight and have a final look before deciding whether to send it. Perhaps Prime Minister Morrison could have waited a few hours before deciding to give a middle-ranking Chinese official global notoriety. 

And maybe Mr Morrison might reflect on the wisdom of hitching his wagon to President Donald Trump in echoing Trump’s demand that China must relinquish its developing economy status at the World Trade Organization (WTO). My analysis of the advantage China has chosen to extract from that status reveals the answer is close to zero. By repeating Trump’s vacuous allegation, Mr Morrison proudly displayed his deputy sheriff’s badge, for all pain and no gain to Australia.

Australia rightly objects to China’s tariffs on Australian barley and wine, applied on the pretext that these products are being dumped onto the Chinese market. But no lesser authority than the Productivity Commission https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/trade-assistance/2018-19/trade-assistance-review-2018-19.pdf has criticised Australia’s anti-dumping actions against China on steel and aluminium, suggesting they would fail if China brought them to the WTO. Nor do Australia’s anti-dumping actions against China appear to be consistent with the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement lauded by the Australian Government.

So, here’s a constructive suggestion. If both countries are truly confident of the legitimacy of their anti-dumping actions against each other, let’s, in a spirit of cooperation, take them to the WTO’s dispute-settling processes for adjudication. And let’s agree in advance to abide by the dispute-settling panel’s verdict without appealing it to the Appellate Body, which is no longer functioning courtesy of the Trump Administration’s veto over new appointments to replace judges whose terms have expired.

In so doing, Australia and China would be reaffirming their support for the multilateral rules-based trading system that the Trump Administration had torn apart. 

As to Australia’s broader national interest, we must never compromise our values, our security or our integrity. And we should say so loudly.

But nor should we engage in gratuitous insults, looking for announceables on national television or tipping out anti-Chinese stories to conservative media outlets so they can parade ethnic-Chinese academics in mugshots. Behaviour that is in the short-term political interests of the government of the day is not necessarily in the national interest.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics. He is Director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT University, a Distinguished Fellow at the ANU and an Adjunct Professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/we-must...

An energy tiger by the tail

The government wants the gas industry to subsidise manufacturing industry. The most likely result is that it gets bitten.

Following intense lobbying by gas-using manufacturing business leaders, east-Australian LNG exporters face the possibility of a government-regulated, artificially low price for their sales to domestic manufacturers. If the Morrison government were to succumb to that pressure, it would elevate sovereign risk to levels that would preclude new gas developments. Having grabbed a tiger by the tail, the government now has to work out how to let it go without getting mauled.

Executives of gas-using manufacturers are pressuring the Morrison government to insert a gas price trigger into two instruments. The first is a so-called voluntary code of conduct that the government has announced should be put in place between east-Australian gas producers and users by February next year.

If the producers don’t come up with a code the users are happy with, the government has threatened a mandatory code of conduct.

The second instrument is the heads of agreement between the government and the three Gladstone LNG projects that the government wants renewed by the end of this year.

 This manufacturing industry pressure follows the urging of former CEO of the Dow Chemical Company, Andrew Liveris, through the now-disbanded National COVID-19 Coordination Commission chaired by Nev Power, who insisted that gas could be delivered to manufacturers at or below $6 per gigajoule.

Despite the delivery of east-Australian gas at these prices being ridiculed by independent market analysts, https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/more-gas-is-hot-air-without-imports-capital-and-a-market-price-20200527-p54x2e gas-using manufacturers have been urging the Morrison government to impose on producers an obligation to supply them at a “competitive price.”

By a “competitive price” they don’t mean a domestic price that is competitive with east-Australian export prices. Rather, they mean the east-Australian long-term contract delivered price must be competitive with US prices – specifically the Henry Hub price, which is a gas price at a pipeline hub in Louisiana.

In other words, east-Australian manufacturers are demanding the government requires east-Australian gas producers to supply them at prices that make their energy inputs competitive with those of US manufacturers. 

Like current US gas sources, gas from Bass Strait and the Cooper Basin was historically associated with highly valuable liquids when extracted, but new large-scale gas resources such as Queensland coal-seam gas do not have liquids. Nor does Australia have the extensive pipeline network of the US. 

Imagine if all Australian manufacturing industries were able to require Australian producers of their inputs to supply those inputs at prices that make the manufacturers internationally competitive – regardless of the cost of producing the inputs.

If this fad caught on, most Australian manufacturers would complain about high input costs from their Australian suppliers and insist they pay their workers the same wages as in poor countries.

A recent report by Tony Wood and Guy Dundas for the Grattan Institute https://grattan.edu.au/report/flame-out-the-future-of-natural-gas/ points out that the east coast has already burned most of its low-cost gas, that rising gas prices primarily reflect rising costs and, contrary to some claims, Australians do not pay more for gas than the countries to which we export.

The only way for the government to meet the demands of east-Australian manufacturers to supply gas at US Henry Hub prices is to insert a price cap on domestic gas. This would constitute a major interference in the Australian gas market, elevating sovereign risk for all investors, including those from Japan, Korea, Malaysia and China who are partners in Gladstone LNG export projects.

We already have enough difficulties with the Australia-China relationship without adding another one. And we are trying to be besties with the likes of Japan, Korea and Malaysia.

Under a binding price cap, new gas provinces would not be developed; the sovereign risk would be too great.

Moreover, drilling for wells in existing fields would be cut back. Fewer wells being drilled would cost jobs in the gas fields in regional Queensland – the last place where the government would want to be seen to be destroying jobs.

Even if, through government intervention, domestic gas prices were reduced to the $6 per gigajoule that manufacturers are demanding, there would be no gas-led manufacturing recovery.

How do we know?

We have real-life experience in Western Australia, where there is cheap gas at around $4 per gigajoule. Yet, despite being closer to Asian markets than eastern Australia, Western Australia doesn’t have a large-scale, gas-using manufacturing export sector. Instead, Asian manufacturers have the advantages of massive scale of their manufacturing plants, lower labour costs and proximity to their own markets.

Energy minister Angus Taylor has made a commitment to the parties to the voluntary code of conduct – of which he has carriage – that it will not contain any hard price reference.

As for the heads of agreement – which is the responsibility of the resources minister Keith Pitt – tentative indications are that it will not contain a direct price trigger either.

However, the gas-intensive manufacturers will continue to pile pressure onto the federal government to require the supply of gas at around $6 per gigajoule if the government’s announced plan of a gas-led manufacturing recovery is to get off the ground.

If the tiger whose tail the government now holds doesn’t get what it wants it will turn around and maul it. But if the government tries to make the tiger happy by giving it the food it is demanding it will kill off any new food sources. The moral of the story is to steer clear of tigers.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics, whose clients include energy companies. The views expressed here are entirely his own. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the ANU, an Adjunct Professor at Victoria University’s College of Business, and Director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT.

 

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-clim...

Refusing to commit to zero net emissions by 2050 is economic self-harm

By refusing to budge on setting a net zero date, Canberra risks being forced to act anyway.

Canberra, we have a problem. Unless Australia commits to zero net emissions by 2050 the Biden administration is likely to impose tariffs on our carbon-intensive exports. So will the European Union and possibly Japan and Korea.

Yet, in an act of economic self-harm, the federal government has reaffirmed since the US presidential election https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/pm-will-work-with-biden-on-climate-but-won-t-change-policy-20201108-p56cid that it will make no such commitment.

Under President-elect Joe Biden’s climate-change policy https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ the US will apply a carbon adjustment fee to countries that lack the US ambition on emission reductions. A carbon adjustment fee is the same concept as the European Union’s impending carbon border adjustment mechanism. The European Commission has released a consultation paper on the design features of its mechanism.

The idea is simple: as a country raises its ambition to reduce its carbon emissions, it seeks to avoid carbon leakage. That is, to prevent its industries that use domestic clean energy being displaced by imports from high-emitting countries, a tariff is imposed on those imports to negate any advantage the importer might enjoy.

In principle, the tariff is set at just the level to avoid carbon leakage and no higher. Otherwise, the country or group of countries could be in breach of their obligations to the World Trade Organization.

Not that those obligations have been met in recent years, as the Trump administration repeatedly flouted the rules of a global rules-based trading system it helped establish. For good measure, Trump neutered the dispute-settling procedures by vetoing new appointments to the Appellate Body as the terms of sitting members expired.

But expect the Biden administration to re-engage with global institutions such as the World Trade Organization, as evidenced by its post-election confirmation that it will re-join the Paris agreement and the World Health Organization.

 Australia’s nightmare was summarised last month by former chair of the US Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, who foreshadowed https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climate-tax-idUSKBN26T23L that countries introducing carbon adjustment fees could form “carbon customs unions” that complied with World Trade Organization rules.

Biden’s climate-change policy commits the US to zero net emissions by 2050 and “will use every tool of American foreign policy to push the rest of the world to raise their ambitions alongside the United States.”

When Britain’s prime minister, Boris Johnson, recently urged prime minister Morrison to adopt a target of zero net emissions by 2050, Morrison reportedly declined, stating, when this part of the conversation came to light: “I am not concerned about our exports. We’ll set our policies here. Our policies won’t be set in the United Kingdom, they won't be set in Brussels, they won't be set in any part of the world other than here.” 

Actually, Australia’s policies might be set in the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States and in Japan, Korea and even China.

It is true that China has committed to zero net emissions by 2060 not 2050, but don’t be surprised if it brings forward that date to 2050 in the lead-up to the climate-change conference in Glasgow in November next year, when countries are expected to make fresh emission-reduction commitments.

Even if China doesn’t sign up to zero net emissions by 2050 and apply carbon tariffs to Australian coal and gas exports, Australia exports plenty of energy-intensive goods to the US, Europe, Japan and Korea.

To illustrate, the European Commission’s consultation document on its carbon border adjustment mechanism identifies more than 127 economic activities and processes for possible coverage, including 13 in agriculture, forestry and fishing, 95 in manufacturing and 10 in mining. So, it’s not just Australian energy exports that would be subject to carbon tariffs, it would be goods produced with electricity generated by coal-fired power stations.

When every Australian state and territory government and every major business organisation including the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Industry Group and the National Farmers’ Federation have committed to zero net emissions by 2050, it should be easy for the Morrison government to do likewise.

The Coalition’s state counterparts in NSW have today signalled their intention replace ageing coal-fired electricity generation in the state with renewable energy https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/nsw-unveils-energy-superpower-vision-backed-by-batteries-20201107-p56cgm If NSW Nationals Leader, John Barilaro – who, with environment minister Matt Kean and treasurer Dominic Perrottet – was instrumental in developing the policy, can make the intellectual transition from coal-fired power, why can’t prime minister Morrison?

Morrison is a pragmatist. He would not be ideologically opposed to shifting to zero net emissions by 2050. His obstinacy can be explained only by internal pressure from the coal brigade, whose insurgency brought down former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull and who wouldn’t hesitate to destabilise Morrison’s leadership.

But any fading opportunity to wedge Labor in the regions for committing to net zero emissions by 2050 evaporated with the NSW Coalition government’s shift to renewables to replace coal.

Damaging Australian exports and jobs by inviting the imposition of carbon tariffs on Australian goods by the Biden administration and most of our other major trading partners is bad policy and bad politics, a uniquely losing combination.

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics. He is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-clim...

A federal integrity watchdog can't wait

A federal integrity watchdog would find itself very busy, but it's vital that it not be weaponised for base political purpose.

Federal politicians and officials who contemplate behaving corruptly or improperly should run the risk of getting NIC’d. Right now, they could be quite confident their wrongdoing would not come to light. It’s time Australia had a National Integrity Commission (NIC).

An under-resourced Australian National Audit Office is exposing rorts and, in one case, possible criminal behaviour, but its shrinking budget is forcing it to cut back on the number of audits it can do each year. Despite these budget cuts, the Audit Office has exposed the so-called #sportsrorts and the purchase of land at Badgery’s Creek for 10 times its market value.

Then there’s the $2.5 billion Community Development Grants program which, at 25 times the size of the #sportsrorts boondoggle, continues to direct the vast bulk of its largesse to Coalition seats.

Programs such as these might not be unlawful, but they accelerate the downward spiral in public trust in our politicians and institutions. Shining a light on them is the best deterrent but in the absence of a National Integrity Commission that task is left to whistle blowers, Senate hearings whose questions are routinely ignored and a few investigative journalists.

Where outright illegality is suspected, the Australian Federal Police can be called in, such as by the Department of Home Affairs in relation to the leaking of an ASIO briefing in an effort to embarrass political opponents. But in this case, as in others, the AFP – which has other pressing priorities – was not able to get to the bottom of the matter.

A favoured approach when a scandal comes to light is for an internal review to be initiated, for it to proceed slowly and for politicians, when asked about the matter, to say they can’t comment because it might prejudice the outcome of the review.

Tip-offs to the media about an imminent police raid are yet another practice that is at the very least improper and at worst capable of putting the police in danger. It has been established that ministerial advisers tipped off the media about the police raids of the offices of the Australian Workers’ Union. And the media were up bright and early to film the police raiding the offices of a NSW state Labor backbencher.

In February 2018, the federal government announced its intention to introduce a Commonwealth Integrity Commission. A bill has been drafted, but public consultation on it has been shelved since the onset of COVID-19. The prime minister has indicated it will not be taken forward while the government is grappling with the pandemic. Meanwhile, the independent Member for Indi, has introduced a bill to establish a NIC. The government, however, has the numbers to prevent debate and a vote on the bill.

If a bill could be agreed in the Senate by Labor, the Greens and the crossbenches, it could be brought on there and passed against the government’s wishes. The government could use its majority to block it in the House but that would be a very bad look.

In a welcome development, the Attorney-General has now released a consultation draft, with submissions due by 12 February next year.

Support for a National Integrity Commission might seem strange coming from someone who was referred three times in quick succession to Queensland’s Criminal Justice Commission, now the Crime and Misconduct Commission. Having left Bob Hawke’s office to take up the position of Director-General of the Queensland Department of Environment and Heritage, I was apparently considered fair game by the Liberal-Nationals Opposition.

The third referral took seven months to resolve following a full public inquiry. It was the worst time of my professional life. As with the first two referrals, I was fully exonerated. My referrals to the Commission and the immediate notification to the media on each occasion led to the Commission calling for a change in the law to prevent a person disclosing that a complaint had been made and the details of the complaint.

The reason for mentioning this abuse for political purposes it to support safeguards in the legislation to prevent the National Integrity Commission being exploited for politically opportunistic purposes. Having punched a hole in the hallway wall of our house out of sheer frustration when it seemed the investigation would never end, continually fed as it was by ever-wilder allegations that I was a drug smuggler and gun runner, I know how a National Integrity Commission could be weaponised for political purposes.

But with proper drafting and in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation, a National Integrity Commission could become law in the first sittings of next year. There’s no excuse for further delay. 

Craig Emerson is managing director of Emerson Economics, director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT, a distinguished fellow at the ANU and an adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://craigemersoneconomics.squarespace....

Has the RBA changed its mind in time?

Failure to proceed with QE will doom a younger generation to dismal life chances to contain inflation that is as dead as Monty Python's parrot.

Yet again the Reserve Bank has been dragged by international reality into shifting its position on monetary policy, making it the tardiest central bank in the developed world in responding to these challenging economic times. It is a conservatism that Australia’s central bank considers prudent but running a tighter monetary policy than our competitors for the last half dozen years has already come at the cost of several hundred thousand Australian jobs.

Governor Lowe’s speech last week signalled the Reserve Bank’s acceptance it has consistently missed its mandated targets for both inflation and unemployment. The stance of monetary policy has been to avoid any risk that the inflation rate might actually slip into the 2-3 per cent band where it is meant to be.

Relying on textbooks from the 1980s, the Reserve Bank has been determined to kill inflation first, before worrying too much about unemployment, despite it being pretty much dead since the introduction of the GST two decades ago.

In Pythonesque terms, at Martin Place they’ve been telling markets the inflation dragon is actually a Norwegian Blue parrot – not dead, just resting, pining for the fjords, ready to recuperate at any moment.

At last, however, Governor Philip Lowe has acknowledged that it is not enough for inflation to be forecast to be in the target range, it must actually be there

https://www.afr.com/markets/currencies/the-reserve-bank-s-new-qe-explained-20201016-p565qm. There was no prospect of it being in the target range in the pre-pandemic world of secular stagnation. And the Norwegian Blue will not take flight in the post-pandemic world of the highest unemployment and underemployment rates since the Great Depression.

Obsessed with fighting inflation, the Reserve Bank has refused to engage in quantitative easing, wilfully running a tighter monetary policy than the rest of the developed world.

Yes, the Reserve Bank has cut the cash rate to just 0.25 per cent. After describing this as the effective lower bound, the Reserve Bank is now contemplating cutting it further to 0.10 per cent on Melbourne Cup Day.

But in a liquidity trap – where households and businesses refuse to borrow more at any interest rate because they feel too insecure to do so – further reductions in the cash rate are unlikely to stimulate the economy.

Belatedly, recognising that Australia's long-term bond rates have become the developed world’s highest – producing an uncompetitively high exchange rate – the Reserve Bank appears set to join the quantitative easing club.

As pointed out in a chart prepared by Saul Eslake’s Corinna Economic Advisory, central banks in the developed world have absorbed 50-75 per cent of national government debt issued since the onset of the pandemic while Australia’s Reserve Bank has absorbed about 25 per cent.

Those of us who have been calling on the Reserve Bank to monetise some of the ballooning government debt  https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/how-to-defuse-the-virus-debt-bomb-20200406-p54he5  including Paul Keating https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/no-help-from-high-priests-of-the-reverse-bank-20200923-p55ygm and former NSW Treasury Secretary, Percy Allan https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/how-to-avoid-a-september-cliff-edge-20200629-p5573z are being branded disciples of modern monetary theory, which postulates there is no virtually limit to the amount of debt a government with its own currency can issue.

This has never been our argument. But just as absurd as modern monetary theory is the proposition that the level of money supply before the pandemic struck was optimal for Australia and remains optimal during the deepest recession since the Great Depression.

Of course, the Reserve Bank should be concerned that, in ordinary times, a government might find monetising debt a nifty way of financing spending to boost its re-election chances. But these are not ordinary times. There is so much excess capacity in the economy, including slack in the labour market, that government support for the economy is both essential and non-inflationary.

And if the independent Reserve Bank ever felt the amounts of debt being raised were excessive and their purposes unworthy, it retains at its disposal tools such as interest rates and prudential requirements on commercial banks to dampen the economy and keep the Norwegian Blue in its cage.

To avoid any perception that the Reserve Bank might be planning to monetise part of the debt, such that not all the debt will actually be repaid, it will maintain the façade of buying bonds in the secondary market, not directly from the Treasury. That is, if the Treasury issues long-term government bonds, the Reserve Bank will not be a buyer because that looks shonky. But if a commercial bank buys those bonds and Treasury buys them from the commercial bank the same week well, that’s ridgy-didge.

If that makes the Reserve Bank more comfortable then it can continue with the pretence.

The substantive question is what the Reserve Bank will do with the long-term bonds when their term matures. If they redeem them from the Treasury, such that the Treasury pays the Reserve Bank the coupon value of the bonds, then the debt is indeed repaid. But if the Reserve Bank just sits on them the debt is monetised.

As long as the federal government continues to insist that every dollar of the debt must be repaid, it runs the risk of withdrawing fiscal support too early, prolonging the recession and lengthening the dole queues. It has already signalled that it considers Labor’s childcare reforms to restore work incentives for mothers are unaffordable. Will it cut JobSeeker too hard and terminate JobKeeper prematurely?

Governor Lowe’s speech last week might be a welcome indication that the Reserve Bank will not be a willing accomplice in the destruction of the life chances of a generation of young people, especially young women. That would constitute genuine progress.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s college of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/has-the...

Counting Australia's democratic blessings

Our politicians do not gerrymander boundaries, or pardon criminal mates, or stack the highest court as Trumpian America does. But we still need a national integrity commission.

When you are thinking that after the bushfires, floods, coronavirus and economic destruction not much more can go wrong in 2020, just turn to the United States for assurance that it can. But whatever calamity the hand of fate delivers us in the future, we Australians can be far more confident of our institutions protecting us against political and criminal abuse than can the American people. Maybe it’s time to count our blessings and ensure they keep flowing.

Let’s start with the democratic process of voting. State governments run the American electoral system. Eligibility to vote and the convenience or difficulty of casting a ballot depends at least in part on the political stripe of their governors and their legislatures. In Australia, in the Orwellian year 1984, the Australian government established the independent Australian Electoral Commission to conduct elections and maintain the electoral roll.

Australia has mostly adopted the principle of one vote one value, ending the practice of gerrymandering where some state governments drew electoral boundaries to their political advantage. Yet a vote in sparsely populated American states is worth more than a vote in the populous states such as California and New York. This helps explain why Hillary Clinton outpolled Donald Trump in 2016 by 3 million votes but lost the presidential race.

These weaknesses in the American system predate Trump. But he has systematically attacked American institutions designed to provide checks and balances against the misuse of political power. The American President has the power to pardon criminals convicted under federal law. Trump’s predecessors have exercised this power, but Trump’s commuting of a 40-month prison sentence for his political ally, Roger Stone, was described by Republican Senator Mitt Romney as "unprecedented, historic corruption."

If an Australian politician sought to influence a court to grant clemency to a friend or ally it would be a national scandal. Australian politicians criticising court decisions can be found to have committed the offence of contempt, a prospect that led to three federal ministers apologising to the Victorian Court of Appeal in 2017 for their adverse comments on a sentencing decision.

During the Black Lives Matter protests in Washington DC in June 2020, Trump called in the military and the police to clear a pathway through the protesters so that he could display a bible in front of a church. Australian media representatives were among those physically attacked by police. America’s top general, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley, wearing his combat uniform, followed Trump to the church. A week later, General Milley issued an apology, stating “I should not have been there.”

Australian political leaders would not countenance deploying the military in this way and nor would our military leaders.

Trump is determined to install a conservative appointee to the Supreme Court to replace progressive Supreme Court Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, before the 3 November presidential election. This would further tilt the Supreme Court to the conservative side.

Australian political practice generally has not been to seek a High Court that is politically biased one way or the other. At least in the modern era, the High Court has not been perceived to be particularly conservative or progressive.

If, compared with Trump’s presidency, Australia is doing pretty well in protecting its institutions and maintaining the separation of powers, where are we faltering?

The Australian National Audit Office has exposed the so-called Sports Rorts scandal that led to the resignation of a minister, its audit raising numerous largely unanswered questions. It also found the infrastructure department had paid 10 times the market value of a block of land at the Badgery’s Creek airport site.

The Auditor General has written to the Prime Minister, requesting the Office’s funding be placed on a more sustainable basis following recent budget cuts and a reduced number of audits. With the budget deficit this year likely to exceed $200 billion, a request for several million dollars to restore the Audit Office’s budget seems entirely reasonable.

Some federal Victorian politicians are alleged to have misused their electoral allowances for branch-stacking purposes. The government has called in the Department of Finance to investigate. Without physically witnessing these transgressions as they occurred, the department will need to rely on written statements that no misuse occurred. Those statements are very likely to be forthcoming. Case closed.

The major parties are committed to establishing a Commonwealth Integrity Commission. Attorney-General, Christian Porter, confirmed in May 2020 the existence of draft legislation, but has indicated its release is being delayed owing to the government’s attention being diverted to dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Release of the draft legislation for public comment would provide assurance that the government is genuinely committed to establishing a Commonwealth Integrity Commission during the current parliament.

Unlike Trump, the Australian government is not systematically undermining the institutions and the separation of powers vital to protecting our democracy. Australia’s democracy would be strengthened by reaffirming the protections put in place by the Constitution, the courts and successive Australian governments. And our hopes and spirits would be lifted by a properly funded Australian National Audit Office and the establishment of a Commonwealth Integrity Commission.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the Australian APEC Study Centre at RMIT and an adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/count...

Fear is crushing reform spirits

Productivity-driven reform is impossible when the rhetoric is all about threats to security and sovereignty.

Not since the World Trade Center bombings almost two decades ago have world events conspired to create such a climate of fear. In the coming election year, conservative forces will stoke fear in the Australian electorate with the aim of persuading voters that a change of government is too risky. It’s a tried and proven copybook, but it will have high costs for the country: essential economic reform is impossible when people are so frightened that they bunker down and cling onto what they’ve got.

Consider a couple of chapters from the playbook. Just weeks before Al Qaida’s attack on the World Trade Center, a Norwegian vessel, the Tampa, sailed into Australian waters under the guidance of the Australian rescue coordination centre, carrying asylum seekers it had rescued from a sinking vessel.

The Howard government introduced the Border Protection Bill, which deemed lawful any action taken by officers or agents of the Commonwealth. Labor opposed the bill on the basis that no one should be exempted from Australia’s laws relating to assault and murder, however unlikely those crimes would be committed.

Speaking on the bill in Caucus, I concluded: “This will cost Labor the election, but we must oppose it.”

I was right. The Howard government warned there might be terrorists on those vessels and Labor was portrayed as traitors to the Australian people.

Throw forward to the period leading up to the 2013 election. Labor’s market-based carbon price would wipe Whyalla off the map, force up the price of a leg of lamb to $150 and jack up electricity prices to unimaginable levels.

Then in the 2019 pre-election period, Labor’s support for the Medevac legislation, possibly allowing up to a couple of dozen sick asylum seekers to be treated in Australia, would cause a flood of “murderers, rapists and paedophiles” who would take the places of Australians in public hospitals and on public housing waiting lists.

These fear campaigns were not conducted exclusively by the Liberal and National parties; they were assisted and funded by Facebook groups and conservative supporters including NewsCorp outlets.

Labor, too, has run effective scare campaigns, its 2018 claim that the Turnbull government planned to privatise Medicare helping it gain 14 seats. But in the modern era it hasn’t resorted to race-based politics.

For a government keenly searching for a bogeyman, Chinese spies and their Australian sympathisers seem ideal. To be clear, China has been behaving appallingly in the last few years, in the South China Sea and Hong Kong, threatening Australian exporters with reprisals for Australian government national security measures, launching spurious anti-dumping actions and harassing Australian journalists in China.

But if the Australian government has a national security announcement to make, it should hold a media conference instead of tipping it out the previous evening to its favourite NewsCorp newspapers so they can spin it as anti-Chinese, complete with mugshots of suspicious Chinese academics.

And if national security officers are going to raid the home of a state Labor MP, or any elected official for that matter, perhaps it would be prudent that the media not be invited to accompany them.

Notice that in the US Presidential election campaign Donald Trump refers to his rival as “Beijing Biden”, to China as “Chin-ah!” and to COVID-19 as the “China virus”?

Now that all those Sudanese gangs the Liberal Party claimed were preventing Melburnians from going out to restaurants have disappeared, conservatives will be keenly looking for a new group to vilify.

A restraint on the Liberal Party doing this is its hold on the marginal seats of Chisholm, Reid and Banks, which have large numbers of Chinese-Australian voters. But that won’t stop the Liberals’ conservative proxies and NewsCorp.

After a couple of early slipups, where Prime Minister Morrison appeared to take on the mantle of deputy sheriff to Trump, he has been adroit in his public statements about the Australia-China relationship. Foreign minister, Marise Payne, and trade minister, Simon Birmingham, have been excellent. So, too, has the Labor leadership.

But in a climate of fear engendered by COVID-19, its economic aftermath and the fractured relationship with China, words such as “security” and “sovereignty” are appearing every day in the government’s economic rhetoric.

By way of example, security and sovereignty have provided the political context for Liberal interventions in gas markets.  

In a climate of fear, productivity-raising economic reform, vital to Australia’s future prosperity, will be impossible. The landmark reforms of the Hawke-Keating era to fashion Australia’s open, competitive economy, though undertaken in challenging economic circumstances, nevertheless were sold to the Australian people in a spirit of optimism about the future.

At a time of great-power rivalry, when the global trading rules are being flouted, the main political parties should reject the political allure of turning inwards, protecting industries under the banner of sovereignty and intervening unnecessarily in markets. And the Coalition’s proxies and media allies should refrain from further damaging Australia’s trade relationships by stoking Sinophobia.

Craig Emerson is a distinguished fellow at the ANU, director of the APEC Study Centre at RMIT and adjunct professor at Victoria University’s College of Business.

Source: https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/fear-is...